Nietzchean and Lacanian Examination of Cain's Creative Failure and the Determined Fall in Byron's Cain by Sullivan, Gregory
A NlETZSCHEAN AND LACANIAN EXAMINATIO
OF CAIN'S CREATIVE FAILURE
THE DETERMINED FALLIN
BYRONSCAIN
By
GREGORY SULLIVAN
Bachelor of Arts
East Central University
Ada, Oklahoma
1996
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May, 2000
A NIETZSCHEAN AND LACANIAN EXAMINAnON
OF CAIN'S CREATIVE FAlLURE AND
THE DETERMINED FALL IN
BYRON'S CAIN
I.
Thesis Approved:
u
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The idea ofworking with Cain came to light for me first in a seminar in Romantic
poetry given by Dr. Martin Wallen in 1998. The theoretical ideas were emerging much
earlier. I began studying Nietzsche, for example, in 1991, the year ofmy graduation from
high school and entry into undergraduate studies. However, I really only came to think
about Nietzsche in a way that would lend itself to literary study in Dr. Wallen's Literary
Criticism and Theory seminar of 1996, where I was also introduced to the work of Lacan.
I greatly appreciate the encouragement, advice, discussion, and direction which has
allowed me this progress. Specifically, I refer to the seminars above and others, under
very good professors, and particularly, Dr. Wallen, who has fostered my pursuance of
projects which have always led to a greater understanding ofkey thinking, both literary
and philosophical. Dr. WaIJen is, in Heideggerian terms, a true preserver.
I sincerely appreciate the time which my general advisor, Dr. Edward Walkiewicz,
and the other members of my thesis committee, Dr. Linda Austin and Dr Robert Mayer,
have given. The latter two, specifically, took time out of a busy semester and busy
positions to read and critique this work, for which I am thankful. Dr Wallen was kind
enough to read and mark my work several times over the past semesters, undoubtably a
sometimes tedious task. I hope my prose and general rigor is the better for it.
I need also to thank Jason Murray, a very good friend who will succeed in all he
does, whether sanctioned by a system of learning or not. He, kindly, took the time to
III
critique early drafts of my work, a task for which one who favors clear English must have,
at that stage, been particularly nerve,...wracking.
My parents also deserve much thanks, for their longsuffering support from afar.
Finally, I should give thanks to Cannella Braniger, a great friend and partner, who
read my thesis more than anyone besides me and always remained encouraging and helpful
with her suggestions. She brings much joy.
I~ .
:' t l
tv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
Introduction ! ~ I
The Limits ofDeterminism: Looking Into , ,.
and Out of the Systems ofNietzsche and Lacan 10
oS •
Cain and the Propagation ofFailure in the Line of Adam 36
Conclusion 66
(' t
Works Cited 72
, ; .
II'
v
Introduc ion
Paul Elledge indicts the philosop.bical stances in. Byron's Cain: A Mystery as
"bland" (50). Yet, the manner in which these stances operate in! eract, and shift i
particularly sophisticated, and points to important issues concerning systems,l not taken
up thoroughly until Nietzsche and then twentieth-century thinkers. 2 Byron emains an
important literary figure partly because his work, along with certain ofhis character,
stands somewhat apart from Romantic tradition and from other characters in. his texts.
Harold Bloom asserts that "the theme of a quest away from Jilienation and toward an
unknown good is recurr.ent in the Romantics" (233). Byron's work, however, and Cain
specifically~ takes Romantic individuality to the extreme of alienation, rather than towards
a sort ofintegration. Alienation, however, is, merely animplicitissue.3 Themore
important issues in the current endeavor involve the scrutiny the drama places on systems
and their inability to accommodate unique individuals. In addition, this drama significantly
opens the way for, suggests, and begins to flesh out, methods for maneuverin among
systems and creating expression beyond them. With the utilization ofthe more recent
literary and philosophical theory ofNietzsche and Lacan, we can attain a better view no
only of the events of the drama and their implications, but also of the important early
1 Political or religious systems, for example. But more specifically, throughout this study I
indicate by "systems" linguistic or discursive structures which articulate and grant being to such
political and religious institutions.
2 Elledge's "Imagery and Theme in Byron's Cain," as the title and remark suggests,
concentrates on the poetry of the drama rather than philosophical issues.
3 On alienation in Cain, see, for example, Mervyn Nicholson.
insight this work provides into questions which would only be examined rigorously by
later thinkers.
This study will demonstrate that Cain is an exercise in perspec ·vism w ere
dominant orders are scrutinized, and where attempts at alteration of syst m fail. Cain,
dissatisfied with his positioning within God's rigid system, rebelliously questions and
makes transgressive demands of that order. He makes attempts to construct 8 new system
of valuation based on knowledge, but ultimately concludes that all valuation involved in
human existence is worthless. When he slays Abel in. his attempts to demand God's direct
address, Cain paradoxically implicates himselfin the order he has fervently repudiated.
Contrary to other critics' views on the character ofLucifer, this study will argue that the
"devil" figure in Cain is no tempter or debaser of life, but a creative, unbound being who
provides Cain with an opportunity.to escape God's oppressive system. Lucifer's vista of
the universe and conversations with Cain offer to him a method by which he might create
his own expression .in the vast battery of potential signification. However, Cain i tuck in
an essentialism which disallows him the movement required to construct an order ou ide
the very view ofexistence he has rebelled against. This failure seems the most prominent
failure, and the most prominent irony, ofCain: A Mystery.
Over the years, criticism on Cain has involved several important trends. First,
there has been a tendency to view Cain as an attack by Byron on Orthodox religion. This
approach is, in one form or another, nearly universal.· There 'are a few notable variations
4 For examples, see, especially for nineteenth century criticism, Truman Guy Steffan, who
provides in his book, Lord Byron's Cain, the only thorough survey ofCain scholarship for the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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on this common theme. Stopford Brooke- sees -ain as an attack on religio yet perceiv
a message emphasizing the possibility of salvation at the end ofthe drama. A more recent
exception is found.in Bernard Beatty's ''Cain's Legacy and ain' Tradition,u a 'Study of
conflicting literary modes which finds Cain "profoundl}l Christian" (8). While notion of
Cain as an attack constitute the norm in Cain criticism, they seem far too concerned with
Byron and his motives rather thanwith the events of the text.
Such a tendency to view Cain as Byron's personal attack relates closely to ,another
important trend in Byron criticism, which is biographical: in nature. Critics early and late,
in terms of religious attacks and the characterization. ofCain and Lucifer, tend to approach
Cain in a context which sees Byron's own passions, emotions, lifestyles, as written
thoroughly into his characters and as represented in the characters' actions.s While the
review ofCain as an attack on orthodoxy may be apt, and while Byron's characters may
indeed be interpreted as driven by passions similar to his own, these concerns are not of
importance here. Attempts to explain philosophical and emotional stances of works,
based on Byron's own beliefs and temperaments, ultimately remove empha i from the
work and place it on Byron's personality. In the present case, where my m thodology
involves psychoanalytical theory, emphasis on biography would lead to a psychoanalysis of
Byron. Concerns ofmore importance here involve the positioning of particular characters
and orders within Byron's work., not his own religious feelings or personality.
Another important trend in Cain criticism involves viewing Cain as a tragically
5 This trend is present in criticism on all ofByron's works. For Cain, see, for example,
Stopford Brooke, Samuel Chew, Ernest De Selincourt,. Solomon Gingerich, MK Joseph, Jerome
McGann, and Daniel McVeigh.
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ironic figure. In some cases, critics who take this view regard Cain as a benevolent, loving
man who hates violence and fears death, yet who nevertheless ends up killing Abe
thereby bringing death into the world. In other cases, Gain represents a rebel" who
ultimately fulfills the destiny of the power be rebels against. Stopford Broo e s ms the
chief purveyor of the notion that Cain is originally benevolent, '10v{ing] fife .... [and] all
that is beautiful" (275). Chew also takes up the notion that Cain's "lov~ is always
apparent" (130). Many critics observe the irony in the fact that Cain, so concerned with
and afraid ofdeath, brings it into the world. The notion ofCain as rcebel Tepre ms, in
many cases, an extension ofthe idea that Cain attacks orthodox religion. Without
recourse to Byron's motivations, it: seems clear from the ,events of the text that Cain is in
open rebellion from the beginning of the text. Gingerich provides an important twentieth
century example ofthe notion that irony results from Cain's "fulfill[ing] his destiny[,
which] Cain so passionately wished might not come through him" (269-70). This notion
has generally been accepted as a statement of the prominent irony in Cain.
To see Cain as tragically ironic is proper, but not only for reasons giVi n above.
First, Cain is a rebel throughout the play. Though he does seem benevolent toward his
loving wife, he still seeks out death, and he clearly questions God from the beginning of
the play. Cain's search for death and his persistence in questioning God are non-violent
and carry on the tradition ofhis parents' plucking offruit, but still openly defy God and
the prescriptive system he has forced upon Cain's family. While Cain's tradition is one of
rebellion, those who have rebelled before him no longer embrace that tradition, an
embrace which must exist ifCain's rebellious actions are to falI within that system's realm
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ofbenevolence. When Cain does become viol'ent1 his ironic departure" no th t ofa
removal from benevolence. Rather, the irony ofCain's murder ofAbel .involves the fact
that, in slaying Abel, Cain accomplishes and embodies, the fate ofthe system he has so
vehemently railed against. More specifically, Cain's killing ofAbel parado "cally
accomplishes a departure from rebellion. As Bloom comments on Caints actions,
"[g]enius breaks not only with conventional virtue but with conventi011a1 vice as well"
(248). However, the most important irony results from such a departure b fore the
murder, specifically, when Cain refuses the possibilities which Lucifer offers him, m,favor
of the essentialism he had hated before. This instance of Cain's tragic failure precipitates
other ironies; Cain experiences a moral vertigo on his journey as a result ofhis prejudice
for the system he hates. Returning to earth, Cain clings to the order, murdering his
brother and thus insuring a permanent placement in God's system.
Another important element in Cain criticism involves the role ofLucifer, and
centers around Byron's letter to Murray where the poet declares that
the object of the demon [Lucifer] is to depre [Cain] ... tilJ h fallsinto
the frame ofmind--that leads to Catastrophe--from mere internal irritation-
- . . . from rage and fury against the inadequacy of his state to hi
Conceptions-& which discharges itself rather against Life--and the author
ofLife--than the mere living. (L&l9: 53-54)
Referencing this passage, Elledge asserts: ''Byron articulated the philosophical theme of
his tragedy more coherently than have many ofhis critics" (50). WhiJe Elledge disparages
a particular critical position, he also makes the point that Byron's explanation ofhis "bland
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philosoph[yJ' adequately accounts for a matter 0 which we need no longer tend (SO).
The majority ofcriticism on Cain indeed conceives ofLucifer as a character trying to
tempt ,or debase Cain to the point of accomplishing a second fall. Despite the fact that, as
Steffan notes, "[mlost thoughtful readers have . . . accepted the linterpretation. . . that
Byron had equated Lucifer not with evil but with intellect and knowledge (458), even
those, such as Peter Schock, who see Lucifer offering Cain intellectual freedom,
nevertheless see Lucifer as one who "breaks [Cain] down" (182). Chew's general survey
of sources for Cain presents Lucifer as a deceiver, and Cain.as one who chooses and
implicitly gains intellectual freedom (133).~ However, a more compelling view ofLucifer
sees him as one who offers Cain a real opportunity to escape God's system and to create
and destroy his own orders as required for more appropriate expression. Rather than a
systematic tempter or deceiver, Lucife represents an example of the creative being. who
requires no single established system for reference. He has no interest in accomplishing
the goal ofGod's 0 der; rather, he attempts to show to Cain the opportunity that i
presented by an endless battery of signifiers with no entrenched fonn ofreference.
Peter A. Schock has offered an illuminating study ofLucifer in ''The 'Satani m' of
Cain in Context: Byron's Lucifer and the War Against Blasphemy," where he pre ents
Lucifer as a "radically ambiguous figure . . . [whose] shifting identity does not readily
resolve" (182-83). Schock's examination ofthe influences which produced Byron's
Lucifer figure, and ofthat character's stance in the drama, can be particularly illuminating.
6 See also Paul Cantor, Joseph, McGann, McVeigh, and Nicholson for conceptions of
Lucifer as tempter or deceiver.
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Lucifer represents a unique being who can move among discursive odds at will, and who
can thus shift, identity, and so in these terms Schoc.k! presents amore thorougbgoin
examination ofthis particular character, though in a more literary-historical rather than
discursive, manner. However, while Schock ,argues well tha Lucifer 'instructs [Cain] in
the values, ofautonomy, defiance, and metaphysical rebellion" (182), this critic's argument
falls short and remains in the realm of easy cause/effect relationships ben he as ertSJ that
Lucifer "breaks [Cain] down" (182), or in other words, debases Cain in order to bring
about the fall. Schock's argument, despite its insight, still purports to holdLucifer up as a
tempter, thus confining him within God's system and thereby fixing his identity. Only as a
being outside God's established order, among a variety ofworlds, can Lucifer remain an
identity in flux.
In more recent years, some critics have begun to look more closely at discur ive
structures in Cain. Bernard Beatty, for example, in his "Cain'os Legacy and Cain's
Tradition," has made an examination ofconflicting literary mode in the drama, which
disrupt one another but eventually leave the drama "profoundly Christian" (8). eatty also
extends these discourses to religious views outside the text, and assert that Byron both
controls and is controlled by '1he traditions" (5). Beatty's study represents important
movement in a new direction in Cain criticism. Yet, while Beatty makes the significant
point that the "pious proto-novel ofAdam and Eve is disrupted in Cain by sceptical
history and science" (7), his examination tends toward a study ofthe traditions and
influences which produces Cain, rather than the more specific positionlng of Cain and
other characters in and out ofrelationship to the order of the God ofthe text. Further,
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any assertion of a Christian J!esolution in Cain seems extremely tenuous. Suchan
assertion represents the equivalent ofembracing Brooke's notion that the play offen a
vision ofsalvation. God's order in the text is presented as de potic from beginning to end.
Cain never desires salvation in such a syste~ despjte the fact that he bas becom fully
enveloped by it at the end ofthe drama.
No extensive psychoanalytical approach to Byron or Cain appeared until 1992,
when Laura Claridge published her Romantic Potency: The Paradox ofDesire. Her main
concerns, in the Lacanian reactings she presents, involve the examination ofdesire and its
particular implications as it manifests itselfin the poetry ofWordsworth, Shelley, and
Byron. Her main interest in Byron involves mostly longer works, and she gives a mere
glance to Cain. While her conceptualization ofLacanian desire does not conflict with that
employed here, neither does it inform the readings. Specifically, the current study requires
closer attention not only to the manifestation of desire in Cain, but also to the implications
ofdesire, and what can be done about it. OtheI Lacanian elements, involving linguistic
structures, also work prominently here. Further, Nietzschean formulations inform my
analysis, and for these latter two reasons my study differs not only in scope but also in
method.
My own endeavor involves the utilization of a methodology comprised of several
key Nietzschean and Lacanian formulations. Specifically, this work offers examinations of
Cain based upon Nietzschean and Lacanian ideas on linguistic systems. These ideas
include factors which result from the imposition of such systems, like desire and the bad
conscience. Other concepts, namely Nietzschean perspectivism, the mask, and the idea of
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the unique, creating being, ,allow for maneuvering among and beyond sy tems~ these
theoretical conceptions I explore in the first section, "The Limi s ofDeterminism: Lookin
Into and Out of the Systems of ietzsche and Lacan.." Such a methodo ogy is particularly
fitting for Cain, because the drama provides an excellent model ofman.. of the key ideas
involved in the method, as I demonstrate in the second section of the essay. Cain's most
general irony involves Cain's return to the world he hates. However, up to now critics
have halted at this general assessment, not realizing the complexity with which such an
irony plays out. Specifically, the chiefirony ofCain lays in the fact that, before his re-
entrenchment in God's world, he has witnessed the possibility of new worlds, and new
creative freedem. Lucifer, no tempter or debaser, offers such possibility. Finally, the
manner of Cain's rejoining God's world proves particularly important, in that his rampant
desire persists towards re~imposition to the extent that he forges the new mask ofthe
killer. Such newness, however, is innovation wholly encompassed by God's oppressive
world. Cain's only creativity consists in rearticulation.
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The Limits ofDeterminism: Looking Into and Out ofthe Systems ofNietzsche and Lacan
Despite Lacan's concentration on and allegiance to Freudian conceptions, 'elements
ofhis thought nonetheless re-articulate certain aspects ofNietzschean thought. With
Nietzsche, the subject begins to shift in position from a seemingly autonomous, defined,
and delimited concept towards an increasingly changeable, even fluid, entity hich is
determined in and by discourse; concern with the potency ofthe will also increases,
specifically in terms of possibilities for responding to discourse and transforming it.
Nietzsche repudiates the idea of the free and autonomous will, but certainly the
detenninism sometimes implied in his thinking is not complete and total, as a biological
determinism which precludes all choice. Indeed, in order for persons to order themselves
towards a sublimation ofdrives, there must remain some agency for self-creativity. And if
subjects in Lacan's thinking are to avoid a constitution limited to the discourses they are
exposed to at a given moment, there must likewise exist some similar self-assertion. By
recasting Nietzsche's important conceptions, in light ofLacanian thinking, and vice-versa,
we can better view, analyze, and employ elements from both systems. Nietzsche's
conceptions and schematizations have a perpetual sort of bearing, lending insight by their
own merit, and taking on accent through certain encounters with Lacanian thought.
There are three important divisions in my treatment ofthese thinkers. The first
consists of an examination of important correlations between Nietzsche's "first,
provisional statement of [his] own hypothesis concerning the origin ofthe 'bad
conscience'" (GM IT 16: 84), Lacan's assertion that "[s]ymbols in fact envelop the life of
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man" CCPunction" 68), and the functioning of the signifier as seen by the latter thinker. l
Nietzsche's "bad conscience" is occasioned by the imposition of structures; Lacanian
desire emerges within similar meaningful systems ofenveloping signifiers. My treatment
concerns the manner in which these sorts of structures articulate subjects. Specifically,
Nietzsche's and Lacan's larger structures constitute macrocosms of the more particular
structuring in which we find the signifier involved. Second, I investigate the effects and
by-products which such structuring imposes, in relation to the subject. This section
includes a treatment ofLacanian desire and its accompanying structure, in relation to
Nietzsche's ''bad conscience." These conceptions share certain important implications
related to the lacks inherent in systematization. Finally, I treat the possibilities for
maneuvering within, among, and beyond systems. These possibilities all involve, to
different extents, concerns with the living, creative being as opposed to the passive subject
.. .
of discourse. Nietzschean thought on perspectivist methods ofobjective inquiry, along
with that concerning masks, is the prominent element in this final section, as these
fonnulations specifically propose the means and the methods for working among, altering,
and creating orders. Through my examination of these matters I construct an interpretive
apparatus that will guide my reading in the remainder of this endeavor, the examination of
Byron's Cain.
Nietzsche discusses the origin of the bad conscience in On the Genealogy of
1AIl passages from Nietzsche are translated by Walter Kaufinan, except for "On Truth and
Lies," translated by Daniel Breazeale. I provide section and, where applicable, essay numbers in
citations, along with page numbers. All passages from Lacan are from translations by Alan
Sheridan.
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Morals. He comments on the imposition ofsystem, effecting the change from prituitive to
civilized humans, as a basic factor in fonning the bad conscience:
I J7egard the bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to
contract under the stress of the most fundamental change he ever
experienced--that change which occurred When he found himseJffinally
enclosed within the walls of society and ofpeace. The situation that faced
sea animals when they were compelled to become land animals or perish
was the same as that which faced these semi·animals, well adapted to the
wilderness, to war, to prowling, to adventure: suddenly all their instincts
were disvalued and "suspended" . . .. In this new world they no longer
possessed their fonner guides, ,their regulating, unconscious and infallible
drives: they were reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating
cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their
"consciousness," their weakest and most fallible organ! (GMn 16: 84)
The walls in which Nietzsche says man finds himselfenclosed are not mere city walls--
though they are these too--but are also lines of thinking, lines oflaw whioh make
fundamentally unique, particular, unequal subjects equally accountable, and which impose
responsibility and guiding principles onto all participants. Nietzsche "employ[s] the word
'state'" (17: 86) in his description of the conquering entity which imposes such ordering,
and he expands the concept, using terminology such as "some pack ofblond beasts of
prey, a conqueror or master race" (17: 86). This state, then, designates the entity which
has conquered, as weD as the locus, and the encompassing nature of, the guiding principles
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which have been imposed. The state iSI the forceful entity and also the determining basis of
the system.
Such a "creation and imposition offorms~' (] 7: 86), as outlined here, is of
particular import for discursive concerns. Consider, for example, the passage above
concerning the reduction to consciousness; when. Nietzsche refers to ''inferring, reckoning,
co-ordinating cause and effect" (16: 84), be describes actions which depend upon
language. Clearly, Nietzsche is speaking oflanguage when he explains "a ruling structure
that lives, in which parts and functions are delimited and coordinated, in which nothing
whatever finds a place that has not first been assigned a ''meaning'' in relation to the
whole" (17: 86-7). Language structures subjectivity through such an assignment of
systematization. Subjects ofa political ruler OF of a verbal construction are determined
and given meaning in and through language. They find a place only because that place, "in
relation to the whole," has been predetennined by the linguistic system ofvaluation which
constitutes the subject's world.
Nietzsche's schema for this structure which assigns meaning ,correlates with the
linguistic systematization that Lacan identifies. I pursue this relationship by applying
Lacan's idea of the Other, and his own deterministic structure, to Nietzsche's
systematization above. Nietzsche's state is an Other for those subjected. This does not
mean the state is merely different, or foreign--it is, but this Other takes on another role as
that which articulates and gives structure to subjects in and through language. Consider
by way ofcomparison the formulation Lacan gives concerning the role of this Other as
language:
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Symbols in fact envelop the life ofman in a network so total that theyjoin
together, before he comes into the world, those who are Boing to engender
him ''by flesh and blood," so total that they bring to his birth, along with
the gifts of the stars, ifnot the gifts ofthe fairies, the shape ofms destiny~
so total that they give the words that will make him faithful or renegade,
the law of the acts that will follow him right10 th.e very place where he is
not yet and even beyond his death. (''Eunction'1 68)
Through their speech, a subject's parents have formed a bond, which is also a particular
linguistic order already present when the newborn subject emerges. The place and destiny
of the newborn, like the subject ofNietzsche's state, are bound in such order, which
detennines beforehand the subject's positioning in relation to its world. A child entering
the world, like a people coming under subjection, js given structure, and thus a place and a
meaning, only through the discourse ofOthers. These include the parents ofthe newborn,
who give it language, and the state, which imposes placement upon political or di cut i e
subjects. In either case, a positioning and system ofvaluation are prearranged. Thu , the
subject can only appeal to that system of symbols already established for communication,
no matter how unfitting the system. The language within which human beirlgs must
operate, and which structures them, is that of the Other. The symbolic order, or the Other
of language, "envelop[s] the life of man" (68).
Even more than Nietzsche's "state," Lacan's "Other" can be duplicitous. Both
designate not only the entity which gives language, but also the systematization itself, or in
other words, a particular discourse. "Other" is the appellation for both the .entity which
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has given language, and for the language, as system. given or imposed. Language's Other
because the subject has not had a hand in its creafon. either does the Other as language
reach to individual particularity: this Other as language retains its foreign or estranged
quality. The otherness in Nietzsche's fonnulation is occasioned by the imposition of the
structure inherent in language. The language and structuring agent (the state) are
inherently foreign to their subjects, but an appeal to these agents for placement and
expression is inevitable. Such is also the case with Lacan's Other; a person is given a
system of expression by some fo.reign Other and must appeal' to this Other in order to
approximate and communicate personal identity and history.
Lacan at all times asserts the primac}'! of the signiti.er. In a discussion concerning
the importance ofunderstanding the manner oflanguage'>s functioning, Lacan comments:
"in its symbolizing function speech is moving towards nothing less than a transformation
of the subject to whom it is addressed by means of the link that it establishes with the one
who emits it--in other words, by introducing the effects ofthe signifier" (CCFunction" 83).
The signifier brings about a transformation in the subject because signifiers determin the
paths ofdiscourse. Through interrelationships among subjects and signifiers, based on the
positioning ofthe subject, the signifier articulates the possibilities for the subject's
expression. Lacan comments further, on this determination, in his "Seminar on 'The
Purloined Letter,'" that
the displacement ofthe signifier detennines the subjects in their acts, in
their destiny, in their refusals, in their blindnesses, in their end and in their
fate, their innate gifts and social acquisitions notwithstanding, without
15
regard for character or sex, and that, willingly or not, everything that might
be considered the stuffof psychology, kit and caboodle, will fonow the
path of the signifier. (698)
This passage gives a better idea about the far..reaching implications ofthe signifier--
because of signifiers" presence and alignment in a given field, 'a subject cannot choose
without their consideration. Signifiers inescapably' compel the subject to articulate
meaning through interaction with a determined set oflinguistic circumstances. But what
of"displacement"? For Lacan, there is only meaning through difference. As ne comments
in the same piece, "[t]he signifier is not function,a!" (696). In other words,. there is no
meaning inherent in the signifier, but when involved in intersubjective relationships, such
as that between parents and children, or state and subjects, the signifier articulates
meaning. Through relationships with subjects and other signifiers, signifiers structure
meaning in language through forcing the subject to evaIuate its situation relative to them.
Such situation among signifiers determines the subject--who it can be, what it might say,
where it might go in discourse. With the signifier as its Other, the subject is determined
against the signifier; the signifier summons the alignment of the subject's discourse in
relationship to itself, along the lines ofits own imposition. The ignifier articulates so
forcefully because of its presence: the subject has no choice but to recognize it as an
immovable horizon, and to place him/herself in relation to it.
Lacan's idea of the "master signifier" can also shed more light on the deterministic
formation ofthe subject. In his "On the Psychological and Social Functions ofLanguage,"
Mark Bracher gives a clear and definitive explanation of the functioning ofthis discursive
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componenet:
A master signifier is any signifier that a subject has invested his or her
identity in--any signifier that the subject has identified with (or against) and
that thus constitutes a powerful positive or negative value. Master
signifiers are thus the factors 'that give the articulated system ofsignifiers
(SJ--that is knowledge, belief, language--purchase on a subject: they are
what make a message meaningful. (111)
A master signifier is S'lightly different from "ordinary''' signifiers among which a subject is
aligned in the functioning ofdiscourse. This signifier is particu1arJy important for
individual subjects, as it possesses much more force of imposition. Since subjects form
particularly strong allegiances with master signifiers, there are hierarchies among a mass of
signifiers which Withoutthe intervention of the subject (with particular allegiances) could
not exist. Take, for instance, the way subjects align with nations, religions, careers, ways
of life. Bracher argues:
the subject can ... be deduced from the relation between S1> th rna r
signifier that represents it, and 82, knowledge, or the system ofall the other
signifiers in relation to which 81 represents the subject. The subject, that
is, is what must be assumed in order to explain why oertain signifiers
function as master signifiers and otbers don't. At the origin, S. is to be
seen as intervening in S2, the battery of signifiers, the network of
knowledge. From this intervention of SI in S2, the subject is established as
the hypokeimenon ofthis intervention. (113)
17
Bracher~s description ofthe master signifier explains both the manner in which the concept
ofthe subject provides a point of~eference for discourse and, of the manner in which
particular signifiers~ inescapably present, determine the articulation ofmeaning and
valuation. Bracher's use ofth.e Heideggerian. hypokeimenon refers to the ground which
underlies discourse, that which "always already lies present at the basis ofall relevant
speech and discussion" (Heidegger 30). Thus the subject, as hypokeimenon, and its
relation to the signifier, represent elements imperative for meaningful interactions in
discourse. The subject constitutes a necessary presence which aligns, through its
interrelations, the-battery ofsignitiers, determining their fonnation. Particular subjects
take on an imposing presence, as do signifiers, and in fact provide a grounding basis for
such imposition. While the subject is dependent on discourse and is caught in a position
where it has no choice but to communicate based on the system ofvaluation which
surrounds it, the subject nevertheless articulates the signifying chain. Signification.and
subjectivity, signifier and subject, are thus bound up in an inextricable relationship of
mutual dependence. Although the subject cannot escape the force ofthe elem ot in a
field ofdiscourse, and is thus determined, activities of meaning nevertheless depend upon
the intervention ofthe subject.
When we align the signifier with a particular subject, or say that each subject or
signifier potentially systematizes meaning particularly, it becomes evident that this
structuring pervades all activities ofmeaning, and is not only widespread but indeed
omnipresent. What Nietzsche has given us in his state-structure represents a macrocosm
of the effect of the signifier, where meaning comes about only when subjects are defined
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based on relationships with some determining Other., This making ofa world, which
correlates with the systematization of the state, the Other, and the signifier, ends insight
into the d.etermin.ation of the subjec in language. The subjec , as defined against
signifiers, raises meaning towards itselfand delineates it, determining meanin according
to the possibilities which signifiers and their systems present. Where lines ofmeaning are
summoned, this structure proliferates operations of language, a constant proces of
reordering valuation, based always on the presence or absence of particular signifiets, and
on the activity ofsome subject. '\
Having developed the correlation among linguistic schemas ofNietzsche and
Lacan, we can move now into a discussion of the ways in which uch structuring affects
its participants. The process involving the imposition of valuation affects its participants
in several ways. As I note above, the langUage a child or a 'subjected people receives is the
language ofan Other, is itse1fan Other. In an. explanation ofLacan's Other as language,
Bruce Fink comments: "~e words [subjects] are obliged to use are hot their own and do
not necessarily correspond to their own particular demand" (6). The signification given
through language cannot approximate the particular situation ofthe uniqu being. Lacan
comments: •• I
the child does not always fall asleep in this way [i.e., in imple dreams] in
the bosom ofbeing, especially ifthe Other, which has its own ideas about
his needs, interferes, and in place of that which it does not nave, stuffs him
with the choking pap ofwhat it has, that is to ay, confuses his needs with
the gift of its love. ("Direction" 263)
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The Other as language always retains a foreign, estranged quality and no articulation in
such a removed medium can fully embody the unique situations ofparticular individuals
Inevitably, language as communicative medium over hoots intended meanings -and does
violence to a demand in this way, or it falls short, always leaving, in its inability to meet
particularity head-on, something in the lurch. This something is desire.
Lacan posits desire· as ''that which-is manifested in the interval that demand
hollows within itself: in as much as the subject, in articulating the signifying chain, brings
to light the want-to-be, together with the appeal to receive the compliment from the
Other, ifthe Other, the locus of speech, is also the locus of this want, or lack"
(''Direction'' 263). This want-to-be, or lack, which occasions and makes room for the
emergence ofdesire, is the difference between the subject's wish, which language cannot
fully communicate, and the extent to which the Other as language might articulate such a
communication. In this split, or interval, desire emerges, "[that which] is evoked by any I
demand beyond the need that is articulated in it" (263). The subject's demand exceeding
need and making "an unconditional demand of presence and absence" (265), makes
manifest desire in the split between need and demand. The Other can never fulfill such a
demand for the unconditional inasmuch as it is Other, or foreign, and can never provide or
possess language to express the particularity ofa'being fully. This is the case, whether we
see the Other as language or as another subject or signifier.
Lacan develops these ideas concerning the manifestation ofdesire further, arguing
"[t]hat which is thus given to the Other to fill, and which is strictly that which it does not
have, since it, too, lacks being, is what is called love, but it is also hate and ignorance~>
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(263). Some may assume that language can unconditionally approxima e andformutate
being. But the Other as language has no being, despite its materiality, particularly because
it carmot unconditionally formulate actual being. Language, as a constantly shifting
system ofarbitrary signs, retains in its movement no constant or consistent valuation, and
no inherent meaning which might amount to wholeness. Neither is a language a totalizing
or totalizable system. Language cannot embody particularity fully, because su.ch language
could no longer function as system or structure--there could be no common ground
between speakers. The Other, as, other potential subject or signifier, tacks being for the
same reason: there is a split between need and demand, or in other words, between what
can be expressed and satisfied through langUage and what cannot. This is the same cesplit
(Spa/tung) which the subject undergoes by virtue ofbeing a subject insofar as he speaks"
('COirection" 269). 'CSubject," as a unit oflanguage, supposes a being, a completion, and a
unity. However, insofar as the subject must appeal to a linguistic system for expression, it
lacks being and wholeness, in that language cannot help bu be other and apart from the
inexpressible uniqueness ofindividuals.· When the subject says e'this is who I am," it
inevitably says, with Lacan, "I is an other" ("Aggressivity" 23).
Desire plays a disruptive tole here. We find evidence ofthis influence where
Lacan posits that the "living being would be annihilated [within the deterministic system],
if desire did not preserve its part in the interferences and pulsations that the cycles of
language cause to converge on him" ('CPunction" 68). Desire is the product ofthe inability
to express uniqueness and is itselfunique~ this unique by-product emerges and tattoos
itself into discourse, disrupting the deterministic order. Desire maps the area between
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what can be expressed and what cannot, and continually reasserts this lack in discourse
where it becomes tangled and disruptive in the process of making and hearing replies.
Thus, a system cannot remain static, nor destiny be completeiy determined.
Desire, this force which emerges in the split between need and demand, between
subject and system, makes evident the impossibility ofwholeness and fuels all discourse.
Discourse, thus driven, moves always in attempts to have demand met, to meet demand,
to articulate something closer to particularity--aims which language cannot meet and
which inevitably spawn further desire. It is only by virtue ofa lack, an absence ofbeing,
that any meaning can be communicated through language: a signifier only has meaning
when it comes j.nto contact with subjects and other signifiers. The split between subject
and system insures both an absence where desire can emerge, and the continuation of
desire's moving the chain along in its play between absence and presence.
Nietzsche's structure insinuates a splitting which: bears certain affinities to that
splitting that Lacan develops between need and demand, where desire emerges.. Nietzsche
approaches the split from another direction, There is an evident split between what
Nietzsche calls instincts or drives, which when verbalized take the fOIms ofdemands, and
the system or enveloping Other that is unable to fully express or realize these unique
characteristics and forces. He speaks ofthe "instinct for freedom [being] pushed back and
repressed" and this process resulting in the bad conscience (GM n 17: 87). This statement
suggests that the conquerors' imposed language cannot meet the demands ofthe
conquered, especially if they involve a demand for freedom, but also if they make any
demand in ex.cess of prescribed need. The bad conscience arises in this split between
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subject and system because no matter how fitting an assigned place may seem, that
predetermined and deterministic meaning can never .fully accord with the particularity of
and in ''former guides, [the] regulating unconscious, and infallible drives" (16: 84).
Nietzsche thus sees this inability to express particular meaning, occasioned by the
imposition ofa language, bringing about the bad conscience.
Nietzsche's bad conscience arises in the same Jack, or split, where Lacanian desire
emerges. When we think ofLacan's account of desire as that which drives discourse, we
can discern the correspondence between the two conceptions. The lack wbich occasions
the bad conscience is the same lack of ability to communicate' meaning where we see
Lacanian desire emerging, where demand overshoots need. Desire occasions further
desire, while Nietzsche's lack occasions the bad conscience. What does this bad
conscience occasion? Provoking further attempts by the subject at expression, the bad
conscience also sets up a further lack,. a perpetual lack, like that where desire manifests
itself. In conjunction with a repressed instinct for freedom, the bad conscience influence
further attempts to approximate meaning closer to particularity, as does ever hifting and
unquenchable desire.
Having discussed the configuration ofsystems and their effects upon subjects,
namely desire, the bad conscience, and their relation to one another, we can now move on
to a discussion ofthe ways in which, given these prior factors, subjects might find room to
move between and beyond single systems. The primary means for maneuvering in such
ways involve both thinkers' recognition of the particularity ofthe unique, living being,
Nietzschean ideas on perspectivism and the mask, and Nietzsche's "artistically creating
23
subject' ("Truth" 86). We will deal with these concepts in this sequence then bring them
into relationship with one another. La~ in his statemen: concerning' [s]ymbols ..
envelop[ing] the life ofman" (''Function'' 68), speaks ofdestiny as being prearranged
from beginning to end. When units such as Nietzsche's macrocosmic power structure
involving the state, and Lacan's microcosmic but proliferating structure ofthe signifier
come into contact with subjects and other signifiers, they order and impose ,a structure on
them. These structures determine meaning, and in so doing inevitably pull subjects in 0
such determination, sealing their fate. We should, however, be very careful to remember
that the Lacanian subject is always a divided subject; while it is true that when the subject
participates in speech it is a subject ofdiscourse, there still remains the unique, living
being.
In his "The Subject ofDiscourse," Marshall Alcorn examines the way that
"[p]oststructuralist theory posits the subject as a passive entitY constituted by participation
in social language" (29). ''Lacan,'' Alcorn goes on, "is very much attentive to the singular
and particular nature of the subject" (31). Linguistic systems, while "envelop[ing] the life
of man" (Lacan, ''Function'' 68), are nevertheless not all-encompassing. As discourse is
shifting and fluid, a single static model ofuniversally placed subjectivity cannot be
deduced. Just as signifiers and subjects in their interrelationships create valuation, or
structure language., and thus construct worlds ofmeaning--these worlds, in their constant
reordering due to changes in relationship, cannot become all-encompassing and completely
deterministic as the subject moves among them. Though a subject might put particular
stock in a given system which seems static and holds the subject in its thrall, there can
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exist, nevertheless, other linguistic worlds which tlle subjec might move among. Lacan
deals with such a situation when he speaks of <'the confusion of tongues tak:[ing] a hand
and ... orders contradict[ing] one another in the tearing apart of the universal work'
("'Function" 68). In other words, there exists no universal system ofmeaning but rather a
proliferation ofconflicting and irregular worlds ofmeaning, articulated upon the
intervention ofa particular subject in a particular battery of signifiers. What has been
viewed as a <Universal work" can indeed be disrupted, even «[tom] apa.Jt," which is to say
that though there is a definite determinism in the way language imposes a prepared way on
subjects, this fact does not necessarily make aU linguistic existence a blind determinism.
This disruption ofdeterminism becomes especially apparent when we consider the
continuous demands of desire and the bad conscience on language. Determinisms, like sea
currents, mix, breaking up the flow of seemingly complete discourses. Thus, the unique,
living being moves beyond the determined paths ofone fixed determination.
Nietzsche likewise emphasizes the particular individual, a opposed to the
discursive identity dependent on an expressive means "in common." He expres es this in
the following passage on consciousness, from the Gay Science:
My idea is ... that consciousness does not really belong to man's
individual existence but rather to his social or herd nature; that, as follows
from this, it has developed subtlety only insofar as this is required by the
social or herd utility. Consequently, given the best will in the world to
understand ourselves as individually as possible, <to know ourselves', each
ofus will always succeed in becoming conscious only ofwhat is not
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individual but 'average'. OUf thoughts themselves are continually
governed by the character ofconsciousness--by the 'genius of the species'
that commands it--and translated back into the perspective of the herd.
Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal,
unique, and infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that. But as soon as
we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be. (354: 299)
Nietzsche's account ofthe language we receive is analogous to Lacan's language of the
Other. Nietzsche'slLacan's language is in common, and, aS'soon as it is appealed to for
purposes ofcommunication and definition, we describe not ourselves but some Other, and
particularity is lost. "I," as Lacan comments, "is an. other" ("Aggressivity" 23). Yet,
there still exists the "infinitely individual" human, and this existence can, in its affectation
by the bad conscience and desire, disrupt systems which seek self-containment. Sucb
disruption comes about as a result of the inevitable presence of elements in the individual
which the system cannot account for, presenting inconsistencies-to the unity of the
structure.
Besides recognizing the importance of the individual being, ietzsche also sets
forth other, more specific methods for the disruption of systems and movement am.ong
them. The most important ofthese is perspectivism, but the mask also plays an important
role in its relation to perspectivism. Nietzsche speaks of perspectivism in his Genealogy
as a model for a thorough objective method; the adoption ofdiffering perspectives also
involves constructing an unlimited number of linguistic articulations. Such structuring,
based, as it is, on a lack, leaves a lack. Hence the efficacy ofadopting various
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perspectives. Another perspective or guiding principle, while still limited by its own lacks,
can impinge upon this former. The problemremains that each lac - engenders more, but
with this in mind we realize that, as Nietzsche says, 'lhe more affects we allow to speak
about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thin the more
complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 'obj,ectivity' be" (GM ill 12~ 119).
Considering the shifting nature ofvaluation, a perspectivism, which assumes such constant
shifting as part ofits method,. can allow an observer better points ofvantage in
approximating the situations of particular valuations. Nietzscheanperspectivism offers
possibilities for moving beyond the confines ofa single, fixed linguistic positioning. Such
possibility allows the subject room to transform and work around the restrictions of an
imposed system ofvaluatio,n.
Nietzsche comes at the mask, as with all that his thinking touches, from various
perspectives, sometimes viewing it as an iristrument or herald ofbad taste, sometimes
more positively expressing it as a means to protect one's profuodity,. Always, however,
the mask seems an inevitability. Consider the followiog oft quoted passage from
Nietzsche's preface to Beyond Goodand Evil: "It seems that all great things first have to
bestride the earth in monstrous and frightening masks in order to inscribe- them elves in the
hearts ofhumanity with eternal demands" (2). Even in a context dealing with bad taste,
Nietzsche considers the mask as completely justifiable: "Bad taste has its rights no less
than good taste, and even a prior right if it corresponds to a great need, provides certain
satisfaction and, as it were, a universal language, an absolutely intelligible mask and
gesture" (GS 77: 132). Like the rights ofbad taste, the mask is given a value apart from
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taste. The mask is given as a necessity, like a language. The linguistic semblance in
masking gives the appearance that a given stance possesses a particular type of
importance, or is situated in a given place in a discursive world. Such is the case with any
use ofmasks, whether attempts are being made to comply with or subvert orders.
Nietzsche's conceptions of perspective and the mask bear distinct and important
correlations to one another. Each perspective, like the systems in language, has its own
guiding principles, its own master signifier which articulates signification in particular
ways. These signifying structures make language meaningful, articulate meaning in
language, and indeed proliferate language. Masks communicate the contours of particular
perspectives. The use ofa mask involves the ability to take a cross section, as it were, of
a particular perspective or power structure, to recognize the directions ofits articulations,
and to adopt a stance, a linguistic position, which accords with that particular "world."
The ability to don different masks relates directly to this same ability to shift perspectives.
Yet, just as perspectivism subverts single or entrenched perspectives, an understanding of
the implications ofmasking subverts specific masks. When one recognize that there is no
one perspective or linguistic structure, or in other words, that identity is fluid, the
boundaries among structures, and the requirement that one adhere to one positioning, are
obliterated. We can make an important distinction here: while perspectivism and the mask
relate to one another in that one mask corresponds to one perspective, at the same time
we must conclude that a fixed masking is a limited perspectivism. Perspectivism exceeds
the limits ofany finite mask or number ofmasks, in that it requires a constant shifting.
Perspectivism is more than the donning and putting off ofmasks--it understands the need
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to recognize th.e lack of any single entrench.ed structure.
Nevertheless, while an authentic perspectivism exceeds the limits ofmasking the
concept of the mask holds .important implications in dealing with subjects and placing
them based on their relative ability to constantly shift perspectives. Some subjects> as
Nietzsche points out in the following passage from Gay Science, are stuck in their masks:
The hermit speaks once more--We, too, associate with 'people>; we, too,
modestly don the dress in which (as which) others know us, respect us,
look for us--and then we appear in company, meaning among people who
are disguised without wanting to admit it. We, too, do what all prudent
masks do, and in response to every curiosity that does not concern our
'dress' we politely place a chair against the door. But there are also other
ways when it comes to associating with or passing among men--for
example, as a ghost, which is altogether advisable ifone wants to get rid of
them quickly and make them afraid. Examp.le: One reaohe out for u but
gets no hold on us. That is fiightening. Or we enter through a closed
door. Or after all lights have been extinguished. Or after we have died.
(365: 321)
In order to go among people and to communicate with them, one must take on the guise
of inherent assumptions in a common linguistic order, which is Other. Those whom one
encounters are disguised the same way, but do not want to admit it because they put
particular stock, or more likely, faith, in that dominant order/Other to which they conform.
It takes great pains, or is even impossible for these people to adopt new perspectives, or
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new relationships with or within another order. Further trying to approximatemother in
a given order, and failing to recognize their positioning within the directions the order has
set out, can lead to an experience ofthe uncanny. Such a presence may be uncanny
because it presents features which the fixed order cannot account for, has no place for. If
one did not quickly turn away from this foreign, undefinable entity, one' faith in the order
would be severely shaken, resulting in a sort ofmoral vertigo, a lack of supporting
reference point. Here we see the way that all orders have blind spots, and differences in
masks, or more importantly, the presence ofa fluid perspectivist identity, makes these
blind spots (forcibly, violently, uncannily) evident. The same holds with a situation where
something "enter[s] through a closed door": one, through shifting perspective, makes
apparent a lack in an order, which a member ofthe company cannot see because of the
blind spots in that order. However, those who understand perspective pass around and
under ("um unter') subjects and the structures they inhabit with ease, "as a ghost,"
because with such understanding, boundaries become non-existent (GS 365n: 321; 365:
321). Such does not constitute a leap into an extra-linguistic realm, but rather the
comprehension ofthe arbitrariness inherent in the parameters ofgiven orders. This
elaboration ofthe mask implicitly proposes a method for placing subjects with respect to
their relative achievement of perspectivism. The fixed masking of"company" stifles the
possibility for the constant shifts in vantage required by perspectivism. The "ghost,"
however, characterizes the activity ofthe perspectivist, who moves beyond and might
disregard the strict alignments of totalities ofbeings.
While we have seen that masking is a limited perspectivism, there remains an
30
important aspect of masking which should further be considered: its inevitable creation of
signification. To Nietzsche, one is profound who "encounters his de tinies and delica: e
decisions ... on paths which few ever reach and ofwhose mere existence his closest
intimates must not know[; whose] mortal danger is concealed from their eyes ... [as] is
his regained sureness of life" (BG&E 40: 51). Ofthis profound spirit letzsche posits the
following:
such a concealed man who instinctively needs speech for silence and for
burial in silence and who is inexhaustible in his evasion of communication.
wants and sees to it that a mask ofhim roams in his place through the
hearts and heads of his friends. . .. Every profound spirit needs a mask:
even more, around every pwfound spirit a mask is growing continually,
owing to the constantly false, namely shallow, interpretation of every word,
every step, every sign oflife he gives. (BG&E 40: 51)
This perspective on masking demonstrates the way in which this process, an inevitable
ascription of identity, creates. We see here a process involved in the evolution of a
signifier. This is not simply an evolution of mere adaptation and self-preservation--it is
these things too--but also something asserted, at least perceived as such. This "profound
spirit" calls upon the ordering principles ofworking discourse structures as it passes
among them, and in this way shields these structures and their participants from the
dangerous upheaval that might occur with a glimpse into a new paradigm--and as it is in
the interest of the exceptional that there remain a stable common body, a herd, it also
protects itselfin this way. But this is not nearly all. Passing among these worlds, leaving
31
as it does "word[s] and sign[s]" that provide the inhabitants ofthose worlds with a
mapping ofits "being" and its particular articulation. ofmeaning" this spirit forges into the
realm ofdiscourse through its own perspectivism, and becomes for those who have read
its signs a signifier which summons a perceived stance, towards a positioning between and
among structures. This is a point at which we can tie such an ability to shift perspective to
the individual being. The unique, creative being might disregard the lines of deterministic
systematization so much as to be capable not only of making the boundaries ofidentities
and perspectives fluid, but also of creating new discursive worlds and per pectives out of
the vast non-graduated field ofunaligned signifiers.
To examine further this creative being, we should look to Nietzsche's "On Truth
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense." In1his piece on language, Nietzsche posits entrenched
orders, "the great edifice ofconcepts," as possessing 'lhe rigid regularity of a Roman
columbarium" (85). This structure ofthe dead here corresponds to Nietzsche's state and
Lacan's Other as language. Such a structure becomes rigidified because people "forget ..
. that the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and take . . . them to be the things
themselves" (86). The "things themselves," like living beings, are singular events and
beings, and the expression of them in the metaphor"play oflanguage cannot apply fittingly
to other events and beings. More importantly here, the creative being, or as Nietzsche
puts it, the "artistically creating subject" (86), subverts such rigid ordering. The creating
being does not forget that language metaphorizes being, and does not rely on past
metaphors, whose metaphoricity is concealed, in order to describe the world or express
identity. Rather, the artistically creating subject allows the flow "of a mass of images ...
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[to] stream ... from the primal faculty of imagination like a fiery liquid (86). Equipped
with such an understanding, the creative being continually creates. through an endless
play, its own metaphors for events and beings. as required for the expre sion of particular
identity.
The interpretations of such unique structuring, however. cannot reach to a clear
understanding of the unique individual leaving signals behind: we have only to point to the
misunderstanding ofNietzsche as proto-Nazi to see how a too-quick glance can lead to
dangerous misunderstanding of such a new structure. which cuts across existing structures
in ways that unsettle. in ways that push many towards a strong urge to find some easy
settlement. Understanding this point is important not only because it shows us the way a
perspective. a new signification, makes room for itself and its development. but also
because it shows how new perspectives (which by condition ofbeing new are also foreign)
can be too easily misunderstood towards unfortunate ends. towards ends that seek too
quickly to position the new perspective within an already existing. and perhaps completely
inappropriate order. But this development is also important in that it demonstrate
another way in which the detenninism of"self-contained" or dominant di course
structures might be altered. and broken up--how they are. ofnecessity. altered and broken
up.
Ultimately. all linguistic structures involve a masking insofar as language that
comes from an Other, which is language in common. cannot reach to individual
particularity. Words and the ways they are used become masks whether we like it or not.
Considering this, Nietzsche's and Lacan's concerns with style seem apt. Ifidentity
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depends upon an interpretation ofthe words we use and how we use them, we can, with
style, shape the contours ofour identity. However, the more subtle the shifting of
perspective, the easier it is to misunderstand, to misconstrue, to mistake one for something
he/she is not, and thereby to obliterate distinction. Care must also be taken to keep in
mind the singular nature ofliving beings. Since identity and its perception depend upon
the way language is used, linguistic distinction becomes ,a matter of discursive, and
potentially, actual life and death: ifwe allow ourselves to be enveloped wholly in some
Other structure, or ifwe assume that actual people can be whoJly subjects ofdiscourse,
identities can be obliterated and actual human ,lives become interchangeable tokens in a
constantly shifting game ofvaluation. Since identity is based on the interactions ofour
distinctive positionings, and therefore is a construction, putting together identity becomes
a matter of developing, in an open-ended process, a particular, unique perspectivism for
oneself As Nietzsche comments, "We ... want to become those we are--human beings
who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselve .,
(GS 335: 266). Who we become, who we create, is a matter ofbringing about new,
incomparable perspectives, discourses, and valuations, and remaining aware of such
creativity.
Nietzschean and Lacanian discursive structures bear certain correlations in the way
they see subjects' envelopment within them and subjects' necessity to appeal to such
structures for meaningful expression. Further, such systems occasion Lacanian desire and
the Nietzschean bad conscience, by-products of imposition which emerge in the system's
lack of ability to fully articulate, account for, or express the living being. The Lacanian
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living being, and likewise Nietzsche's creating subject, present in their uniqueness
opportunities for the disruption of rigid systems. Finally, Nietzschean perspectivism offers
the means for maneuvering and creating beyond the confines of such systems, and the
mask presents a way in which subjects might be understood in terms oftheir relative
stasis, perspectival movement, and profundity in creating new meaning.
Such a relationship among these thinkers' conceptions offers an illuminating
interpretive method for a study ofCain because that drama's situations correlate with the
several divisions of conceptions set out here. Specifically, Cain is caught in the rigid
discursive world ofa punishing God, and desires change. In such a situation we witness
the imposition of system and its effects upon the subject who realizes that the law of God
does not suit him in his particularity. Such imposition occasions extreme desire in Cain,
who experiments with a limited perspectivism and fails, proving incapable of shifting in the
fluid manner which that way of existence requires. Cain forges a mask; yet this is not the
constantly shifting, creative mask which attends perspectivism, but instead a fixing mask, a
cipher. The Lucifer character, however, is the ultimate perspectivist, representative ofthe
living, creating being, ever-shifting in his world-views and dancing among the endless
possible signification represented in the abyss of space.
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Cain and the Propagation ofFailure in the Line ofAdam
Nine parts in ten ofa man's sense or his nonsense, his successes and miscarriages in this
world, depend upon their notions and their activity, and the different tracks and trains we
put them into, so that when they are once set a-going, whether right or wrong ... --away
they go clattering like hey-go-mad; and by treading the same steps over and over again,
they presently make a road of it, as plain and as smooth as a garden walk: which when they
are once used to, the devil himself shall not be able to drive him off it. (Sterne Tristram
Shandy 9)
An analysis ofByron's Cain bears out the Nietzschean and Lacanian formulations
dealt with in the previous section. In the beginning ofthe drama, we find God, who Adam
lauds as "the Eternal! Infinjte! All-Wise-I Who out ofdarkness on the deep didst make I
Light on the waters with a word" (11-3), situated as master signifier in an enveloping
linguistic system. This system corresponds to the structure Nietzsche explains in regard to
the bad conscience, and that Lacan deals with in relation to the linguistic system which
"envelop[s] the life of man" ("Function" 68). The characters have been accorded meaning
and value within this system, through their interrelationships involving the presence of
God. This linguistic systematization is Other to the subjects within it. Like the ystems
Nietzsche and Lacan deal with, God's order in Cain is not comprehensive and cannot
reach to the particularity of the unique needs of his subjects.
Cain is an example of the split subject seeking wholeness. Unlike his parents, who
have chosen to quench their erratic desire by God's prescribed means, Cain is driven by his
desire to find a more fitting perspective. Ultimately, his search implicates him in as nihilist,
since he cannot recognize the possibility for any world outside of God's static creation.
Nietzsche's ideas on perspective are important here because Cain tries to shift his pros and
cons, to find a new outlook on existence. In considering the inherent inconsistencies in
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God's lacking order, Cain enabl himself to take a new look, but th onI insight e gains
is that this lack is inherent, predetermined, and purposeful. The disillu ionment enacted by
Cain's realization that there has been and always will be such a lack in God's oed r, that
even knowledge does not lead to wholeness, is ironic, in that God's is the very order to
which Cain clings.
Lucifer, an example ofNietzsche's "artistically creating' being ("Truth" 86),
shows Cain the opportunity to step out of God's essentialist system, giving information
which Cain misinterprets as a deprecation ofall existence. The infinite heaven which
Lucifer presents resembles a vast, unaligned field of potential symbols which have been
assigned no value. Cain takes the unexplainable field as a void; but Lucifer in fact presents
Cain with a chance to step wholly outside God's created system, along with the potential
to arrange and rearrange value and meaning as he sees fit. Despite the opportunity, Cain
adheres to the tenets and prejudices ofGod's world, and ultimately his reactions result in
another fall. Cain abandons his pursuit of another perspective, where knowledge, as he
envisions it, is of key importance, in favor of a position within the original structure, which
he nevertheless rails against. Cain's protest against a fallen state, against an inconsistency,
only enacts further falling, only broadens the scope ofinconsistency in the structure and
the chasm separating him from direct access to bliss.
The linguistic structures ofNietzsche and Lacan, along with that accompanying
desire, aid in an examination of the orders and history Cain. Nietzschean perspectivisrn, in
terms of arrangements of Cain's valuations, is important as we look to his attempts to find
a new arrangement, especially his "quest for knowledge" (ll.ii.230). Lucifer presents the
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point ofview ofthe unique, creative being, outside linguistic worlds and unbound by the
essentialist prejudices of restrictive systems. Cain's rejection ofLucifer's freer view and
his excessive demands and actions, taken together, demonstrate Cain's clinging to and
implication within God's world. While Lacanian desire is disruptive and can alter
determinism, it also serves as a stimulus which, when at a high enough pitch, can provoke
the force of an established system, which reimposes its arrangement more thoroughly.
Nietzsche's emphasis on the creative capacity ofthe mask, is ofparticular°import here.
Despite Cain's failure in perspectivism, he shapes contours ofa particular mask, through
interaction with Abel and action towards God, in the region between his questioning, and
his ultimate reliance upon system. Given these considerations, I begin by presenting a
history and prehistory ofCain, move on to Cain's "quest for knowledge" and its
implications, including Lucifer's role in that search, and finally review Cain's extreme
demands as he implicates himself, ironically, more and more thoroughly in God's
systematization.
We should first examine briefly the enveloping linguistic structure in Cain. In
relation to the ordering imposed upon the humans, God represents the Other of language.
He has given the people their place and meaning in language. Thus, although <<the earth is
young, and yields ... kindly / Her fruits with little labor" (1.49-50), Adam recognizes the
rule that "[e]ach [has] his task and toil" (1.48). Adam's place, and those of his family,
involves working for food. More generally, God has given them a language that he and
not they created. God is the master signifier in this language--all its placements and
meanings are articulated through relationships with him. As the praying Eve exclaims
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early in the drama, God "didst name the day, and separate / Morning from night, till then
divided never-- / ... [AndJ didst divide the wave from wave, and call / Part ofthy work
the finnament" (1.5-8). Eve's hail acknowledges God's iSUprmeacy mall things, and roots
her discourse in ideas ofGod's "nam[ing" and call[ingJ," or in other words his speech,
which has set up relational situations through such faculties. Against this Godly ignifier,
differentiation and meaning comes about, and along with these comes an order of rank.
All things are given their place within this linguistic order. Against the positioning ofGod,
Abel finds his place as ''humble first ofshepherd[sJ" (ITI.237), and Cain his as "a tiller of
the ground" (Ill.216).
An examination of the original Edenic structure, which predates the action of the
play, reveals the way in which this structure determines much ofthe action ofthe drama.
It would seem that God, in placing humans in their place ofEdenic bliss, might satisfy all
needs and preclude demands in excess ofneed. To put it another way, an omnipotent God
might have constructed an order which could indeed approximate the unique individual.
This is not the case. With this original structure, we are not dealing with a special sort of
closed system where all approximations in language are exact. Insofar as we are dealing
with actual human beings, as opposed to simply subjects of discourse, such exacting
approximations are precluded. The implications of t.his situation are fairly evident: God
created creatures whose wishes even his language cannot fully realize. Further, his
forbidding the trees already offers a route to the satisfaction ofundisclosed desires. God's
forbidding the fruit, his announcing its importance, makes it that much more viable an
object of desire. He introduces the unlawful trees as signifiers into the field of discourse.
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The humans know, because ofthis prescriptive introduction, that an open route to an
articulation of some sort is available, advertised through a Godly nomination and notable
placement. In their curiosity about the fruit and experimentation with it, Adam and Eve
take on the desire ofthe Other.
In short, God sets the people up to fail without any necessity of intervention by
serpent or devil. Lucifer points this out shortly after meeting Cain:
Did Ibid her pluck [the fruits] not?
Did I plant things prohibited within
The reach of beings innocent, and curious
By their own innocence? (I 199-202)
By the very nature of the trees' prohibition, Lucifer argues, the humans were bound
already, by God's arrangement, to transgress. God chose to deal with and satisfy the
needs of his subjects in his own way, which might not fit the need, but which results in
desire. Why would God choose to allow potentially disruptive desire into the sy tern?
God included the trees in the garden, or, in other words, included inconsistency in his
order, because ofa certain need on his own part. The prohibition ofthe fruit serves God's
wish to retain his place and disallow too great a disruption in his order. Consider a
passage from Genesis, which Byron looked to as a source: ''Behold, the man is become as
one of us, to know good and evil: and how, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the
tree oflife, and eat, and live for ever" (Genesis 3:22). IfAdam and Eve become as Gods,
or even if they merely rearrange their intersubjective relationships, God's place, at the very
least, loses value. God has shown them something which he forbids them to desire, which
40
is also a demonstration ofhis own wish to retain his position ofpower where aU look to
him for meaning. God ultimately wants his subjects to fail so that he might bind them
closer to himself through punishing them with more restrictive precepts. Paul Cantor
posits Lucifer's stance on God as involving the notion that ''the defects in creation are to
be traced to a fundamental lack in the Creator" (51). As we see here, we can as safely say
that this is indeed the stance ofthe drama itself, as its facts are presented. This lack
consists of an insecurity on God's part~ he needs the safety ofa rigid edifice in order to
maintain his all-important position, and creativity on the part of his subjects compromises
that security.
Thus, with the eating ofthe fruit, the desire-driven cycle offalling begins. In
Eden, God imparts to Adam and Eve that all their needs are satisfied there. With the
eating ofthe fruit, the humans make a demand, and insofar as this demand overshoots
need, it opens a place for erratic desire. Because of the transgression of God's law,
because Adam and Eve find a gap in his order, God banishes them from Eden. This
removal denies not only access to objects ofdesire such as the forbidden fruit and the lost
ease of Eden, but, most importantly, the proximity to God. Adam, who "has beheld the
God himself' (1.503), now "[a]dores the invisible only" (1.499). Adam's offspring only
see God "in his works" (I.505). Adah sees God "in [her] father, who is God's own image;
/ Or in his angels" (1.506-07). God's removal disallows a direct reassurance against doubt
about his nature and identity, and, as God certainly knows, makes the opportunity for
doubt and desire greater. The humans are thus forced to rely much more on the linguistic
order, the embodiment ofGod, which has already failed them, to support their scheme of
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reference. Such a reliance is pervasive, as we find in the humans' constant attention to
God's "nam[ing],""call[ing]," and "mak:[ing] I ... with a word" (1.5; 7; 1-2), or in other
words, attention to God's language rather than his presence. In addition, Adam, and
implicitly the others (besides Cain) '1rust" that God will hear their "fervent[,] ... loud"
prayers, another indication of their reliance upon the language as the entity most
proximate to God (1.25; 24).
God reestablishes his order with certain more thorough restrictions. Knowledge is
in the world, now the object of a need made manifest through the preceding ordeal.
Rather than prescribing some method for the pursuit ofknowledge, or even trying to
account for its presence in his system more fully, God makes his system more restrictive
and decrees that humans must now work for food. A statement from Nietzsche on
physical labor illuminates the reasoning behind such restriction: ''It is beyond doubt that ..
. . mechanical activity ... alleviates an existence of suffering to a not inconsiderable
degree: this fact is today called., somewhat dishonestly, '1he blessings ofwork." The
alleviation consists in this, that the interest of the sufferer is directed entirely away from
his suffering" (GM ill 18: 134). God needs a certain level ofdesire so that he may
continue to bind his subjects through punishment; but he does not want a continuation of
open rebellion, and so he redirects such desire with work, in the manner Nietzsche
describes here. Adam and Eve accept the bad conscience associated with the unfitting
system, which has been imposed upon them, and find alleviation from their internalized
ordeal through physical labor. While Cain's family seems to accept this redirecting work
ethic, Cain cannot follow in such a glaring, self-abnegating, contradiction.
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The erratic desire ofAdam and Eve passes to their son, whose desire is the desire
ofthe Other, namely his mother, but also of God and Adam. It is little wonder that their
son, who acquired his language from them and "heard [God's words] from those who
heard them" (1.206), should desire the same things they had, along with the things newly
forbidden them after the fall. Eden, along with the trees of Cain's parents, is notably
advertised to Cain by angels and humans. For example, the "fiery-sworded cherubim"
(1.173) that guard Eden rearticulate the original prohibition of the fruit and at the same
time point Cain's way to that realm which he desires. Also, though it avails neither Adam
and Eve nor their offspring to speak of the Eden they cannot regain, they "talk to [Cain] I
Of serpents, and of fruits and trees" (1.1 70-71), passing their desire for that place on to
their son. Cain, like his parents, is split due to the fact that a certain order imposes upon
him which cannot approximate his unique needs, being, or identity. As Cain comments
regarding the contrast between discourse and his own experience, ''I never could I
Reconcile what I saw with what I heard" (1.168-69). Cain does not know the bliss of
Eden--he sees only the toil ofhis own life, split off from his parents' description-but he
has been taught to desire it.
The lack Cain perceives in God's order consists of several factors. For one, Cain
did not commit the original sin, and he wonders why he too suffers for it: ''Toil! And
wherefore should I toil?--because / My father could not keep his place in Eden. / What had
I done in this?--I was unborn" (1.65-67). Cain's punishment is misplaced. The ''I'' of
Cain's subject "had ... done" nothing in the Edenic transgressions of his parents, yet he is
placed in a system where he takes on the guilt of those crimes. Cain's questioning is a
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demand that language, and God as Other of language, accommodate Cain in his
particularity. He is not the same man who sinned, but the imposition of structure
implicates him as such. Another factor in Cain's critique ofGod, as good, is Cain's
recognition ofinconsistency in valuation. Cain comments: "Because I He is all-powerful
must all-good, too, follow'?" (1. 77-79). God, supposedly "all-good," is only "all-
powerful" in his imposition, and also "didst pennit the serpent to creep in" (1.19). God
pennits or even fosters evil--the evil of the snake, ofthe discomfort of toil, and of
imposing the parents' guilt on the children.
Cain experiments with a perspectivism resembling that which Nietzsche describes,
but falls short. This experimentation demonstrates Cain's desire to rearrange God's world
so that it might align better with his own subjectivity. Cain, the only character willing and
able to rearrange his pro's and con's in order to design a new, more apt perspective, is
bound to fail. For one reason, any demand of God's system is transgressive. God's order,
which wants to be the only order, would not have another signifier arrange meaning
towards itself, or ''become gods as we" (1.105). Cain himself can never forsake God's
world enough to realize that 1) other linguistic worlds wholly outside God's world might
be articulated, and that 2) the absence of an entrenched, created world, is not necessarily
the equivalent of a void as absence of all possible worth. Cain's desire to create a new
perspective closes off any perspectivism in that the latter involves a constant shifting, not
merely a switch to a single perspective, even ifnew. I treat first Cain's failing search for
knowledge, and move into a discussion ofLucifer and the information with which he
provides Cain.
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The route Cain pursues to arrange a new perspective invol es a "quest for
knowledge" (TI.ii.230). Cain wants to set up a perspective which emphasize knowledge
as opposed to an "all-good" God and work. Knowledge has in fact become the object of
Cain's desire. After his questioning ofthe need for toil, cited above, Cain continues:
Toil! and wherefore should I toil?--because
My father could not keep his place in Eden.
What had I done in this?--I was unborn,
I sought not to be born; nor love the state
To which that birth has brought me. Why did he
Yield to the serpent and the woman? or,
Yielding, why suffer? What was there in this?
The tree was planted, and why not for him?
Ifnot, why place him near it, where it grew,
The fairest in the centre? (1.65-74)
Here we see Cain's fervor for knowledge, which he believes will help him understand the
split imposed upon him. As Cain points out that God's imposed order is more fitting for
his father than for himself, he endeavors to question and search out the nature of things.
Cain questions not only his parents' motivations, but more importantly, those ofGod.
When he asks "why place him near it ... / The fairest in the centre?" (I.73-74), Cain
comes close to discovering that God has in fact set his father's race up to fail.
Cain concentrates on the gaps in God's order, yet his analysis proves strictly
limited. For example, he wants to know how, if"knowledge is good, / And life is good[,]
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· .. how can both be evil?" (1.37-38). He wants to know why the humans should not have
the trees' fiuits ifthe fruit is essentially good. In his constant questioning, and in his
sentiment that Lucifer "canst not / Speak aught ofknowledge which [he] would not
know" (1.247-48), Cain seeks to set knowledge up in an aU-important position like that of
God. Cain's concern, moreover, is not with knowledge in any relative sense, where it
manifests itself to him differently according to situation, but in an essential sense, where
knowledge is a quality in itself Nietzsche posits, in ''Truth and Lies," that '"Every word
instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder
of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin" (83).
Cain concerns himselfwith the concept of knowledge as a "good" (r.37) in itself, a
concept which he has received through discourse and not through any "individual original
experience" (Nietzsche 83). Cain's conception ofknowledge comes from God's created
system. This condition presents problems because, in the context of God's system, one
can only see knowledge as a value in itself God's world is an essentialism because its
relationships and positionings are fixed, and are taken as possessing value in themselves.
Knowledge occupies for Cain the same original positioning as something good in itself,
thus precluding an escape from the essentialist world-view from which he originates.
Cain merely seeks to rearrange qualities already present in God's discursive ordering,
which because of such entrenched placement, are, like God, considered as essential
qualities. Even when elements are moved around, the fixed system determines that the
positionings will retain their original value. For example, if Cain moves knowledge into
the position ofGod, he merely makes knowledge his God and oppressor--he will seek
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wholeness in knowledge rather than God, but this new God, in its predetermined position,
can only keep Cain lacking wholeness. As Cain himself comes to believe the tree of,
knowledge '\vas a lying tree" (ll.0.161); the tree's ''promised knowledge" (162) proves as
unfitting for Cain as God's ill placement ofhim and his family in the post-Eden world.
This fact dooms to failure Cain's search for a more fitting order.
Cain's search itself implies his beliefthat through pursuit of essences he might be
made whole. Here we find Cain's prejudice about essential qualities and the goals ofhis
Journey:
LUCIFER. Was not thy quest for knowledge?
CAIN.
The road to happiness
LUCIFER.
Thou hast it.
Iftruth be so,
Yes: as being
CAIN. Then my father's God did well
When he prohibited the fatal tree. (TI.ii.230-33)
Knowledge and happiness are equatable for Cain to an essential good, a completeness or
wholeness. When Cain brings up happiness, like knowledge, he depends on that
conception ofhappiness received in the confines ofGod's system. In other words, he
seeks a return to Edenic bliss, through knowledge, since the only happiness he has heard
of in his toiling life is ''what [his parents] call their Paradise" (1.172). Cain has no
experience of such bliss. In God's system., he might only figure his experience as "toil"
(1.65). And, not realizing the value of"individual original experience" (Nietzsche ''Truth''
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83), he can only rely on an imprecise concept which he has received. Ifhe questions far
enough to realize that what God deems as good may not necessarily be so, he nevertheless
is left believing that "happiness" has everything to do with a regained Eden and with an
impossible renewed wholeness within that same inconsistent system. Such a quest is
bound to fail, as wholeness is never a viable goal for an identity within the confines of
systems: any system will always have its lacks. Cain's attempt at perspectivism fails
because he has in fact never shifted his point ofvantage. Upon Cain's return from space,
he displays not some new perspectivist attitude, but rather "feel[s] / [His] littleness again"
(llI.67-68). And rather than a stance which redirects or negates the imposing placement
ofguilt which characterizes God's world, Cain continues to participate therein,
condemning his parents for his own dissatisfaction: '~ey sinn'd, then let them die!"
(ID.76). Besides these problems, Cain sought to create a single perspective, rigid like that
of God, rather than a shifting, creative perspectivism, which must persist in fluidity. He
merely substitutes knowledge in the place ofGod, leaving the system and its positionings
intact.
The main failure ofCain is not the murder ofAbel. The roots of this failure lay in
the more fundamental failure of relying on essentialist prejudices and misinterpreting and
rejecting Lucifer. Despite his protest against God, Cain can only understand things,
events, and beings, in terms of that one rigid discursive creation, as we have seen with his
understanding of knowledge and happiness. Even his attempts to rearrange God's order
merely maintain it, and these attempts clearly aim at some unattainable past, not any new
creativity. In this way, in clinging to stasis, Cain is a nihilist. He is one "who [is]
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disguised without wanting to admit it" (Nietzsche GS 365: 321). Cain begins to show a
more self-abnegating nihilism near the end ofhis journey: "It was a lying tree--for we
know nothing. / At least it promised knowledge at the price / Ofdeath--but knowledge
still: but what knows man?" (II.iiI61-63). Lucifer's answer reasserts the authenticity of
the tree's promise: "It may be death leads to the highest knowledge~ / And being of all
things the sole thing certain, / At least leads to the surest science: Therefore / The tree was
true, though deadly" (II.ii.164-67). Cain, however, eventually takes his answer, along
with his other comments about pointlessness, to indicate a nihilistic world-view on
Lucifer's part. Despite Lucifer's exposition of a limitlessness of worlds, "such realms"
(TI.ii.167) merely prompt in Cain the conviction that "all / Seems dim and shadowy"
(ll.ii.17S-76). Cain hears, in Lucifer's statement on death, that only actual death leads to
knowledge, that the highest knowledge is only attainable after death. And if this is so,
then what value has a life in pursuit of knowledge? Exclaiming "Alas, I seem / Nothing"
(ll.ii.420-21), Cain voices this latter sentiment. The message Cain gleans from Lucifer's
journey convinces him that on either side of short painful human existence is an eternity.
In light of this idea, Cain cannot see how mortal life should be worth anything, partly
because he is so uncomfortable trying to orient himselfwithin the vastness ofeternity and
endless space, a field of endless possibility but without the securely fixed valuation to
which Cain is used.
Unlike Cain, Lucifer abhors the entrenchment of a system. Lucifer represents the
living, creative being discussed by Nietzsche and Lacan. Lucifer begins the journey into
"The Abyss ofSpace" with a critique of God's discursive world and the conviction which
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binds subjects there:
Believe--and sink not! doubt--and perish! thus
Would run the edict of the other God,
Who names me demon to his angels~ they
Echo the sound to miserable things,
Which knowing nought beyond their shallow senses,
Worship the word which strikes their ear, and deem
Evil or good what is proclaimed to them
In their abasement. (ll.i.5-12)
Lucifer notes that the humans are bound by the system of ' 'the word which strikes their
ear" (ll.i.lO). The messages passed along through God and his angels have arranged the
humans' subjectivities. The humans have emerged in a discursive world which orders
them, holds them in check, and which they cannot see past. Lucifer clearly distances
himself from such a need, and also suggests that the humans should refine their own
experience of perception through paying more attention to their "shallow senses" (ll.i.9),
representing their own living being, as opposed to the words which order them, which
hold them enthralled as passive subjects of discourse.
In giving Cain infoI1Jl3tion about the essences he perceives, Lucifer further
distances himself from created orders:
CAIN. But one of you makes evil.
LUCIFER.
CAIN.
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Which?
Thou! for
Ifthou canst do man good, why dost thou not?
LUCJFER. And why not he who made? I made ye not;
Ye are his creatures, and not mine. (ll.ii.393-96)
Cain remains under the assumption that since Lucifer is contrary to God, and that God is
supposedly good, then Lucifer must be evil. However, Lucifer points out that this line of
thought does not necessarily follow. "(H]e who made" (TI.ii.95) also made evil, allowed
it, and dealt with matters in a way where desire would inevitably spring up, leading to
more evil. More importantly, Lucifer makes the point that he does not require the
creation of subjects in order to retain a position within any world. He does not, as does
God, feel the need to gratifY or to flatter himselfby creating a world of signification where
he is the basis of constant and unchanging valuation. As Lucifer comments just before the
interstellar journey, '1 would be aught above--beneath-- I Aught save a servant or sharer
ofI His power. I dwell apart" (1.306-08). Further, Lucifer declares that he "[p]refer[s] an
independency oftorture I To the smooth agonies of adulation" (1.385-86). Since Lucifer
has no need to create any binding "adulation," he need neither fonn alliance with any
particular, much less essential, articulation or principle.
Lucifer presents an example ofNietzsche's creating subject, and markedly
contrasts with God, who wishes to maintain a rigid edifice. Cain's early solution for
mending the inconsistency between the two introduces a fitting opportunity to contrast
them: "Would there were only one ofye! perchance I An unity of purpose might make
union I In elements which seem now jarr'd in storms" (ll.ii.377-79). While this passage
suggests that Cain may want to merge God and Lucifer in order to create a more fitting
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order, Cain does not realize that the two entities are not at all compatible. This is not to
say that they do represent good and evil, as essential qualities--this is only the view from
within God's world-but that God requires his entrenched order, in order to maintain his
position as master ofcreated system. The independent Lucifer, on the other hand, could
never be pinned down within any system, and could never exist as such in his always
"dwell[ing] apart" (1.308). Cain's diametrical opposition of God and Lucifer, and good
and evil, is prejudiced through its entrenchment in God's world, just as are his conceptions
ofknowledge and happiness. Lucifer neither has a hand in the creation of evil, nor in any
creation ofcreature, system, or valuation whatsoever. He does not experience the same
need to establish monolithic hierarchies ofvaluation which through their placement of
subjects bind all who are involved in particular positions, including the supreme being.
Lucifer who would always "[p]refer an independency oftorture / To the smooth agonies
ofadulation" (1.385-86), does not desire wholeness or an unequivocal essence, unlike
Cain--such a wholeness would be stifling for the energetic, creative being,.
Lucifer understands good and evil as relative concepts, a point which he drives
horne when saying ''He as a conqueror will call the conquer'd / Evil; but what will be the
good he gives? / Were I the victor, his works would be deem'd / The only evil ones"
(II.ii.443-46). He claims that the meanings ofgood and evil are all in the deeming. A
structure that has been imposed, to keep itself secure, says that the imposition is good.
Lucifer also points out that all subjects can themselves deem things good or evil, despite
the imposed prescriptions in a system: ''Evil and good are things in their own essence, /
And not made good or evil by the giver; / But ifhe gives you good--so call him; if / Evil
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springs from him, do not name it mine" (ll.ii.452-55). Lucifer's use ofccessence" is
misleading; he does not mean that good and evil are essential qualities, but that good and
evil are not valued negatively or positively in themselves, but only in God~s world. They
exist, he implies, but apart from values. Lucifer's admonition to rely upon individual
perception urges Cain to recognize the living, creative being with unique senses,
perceptions, and drives. Even as the journey ends and Cain is oblivious to the opportunity
Lucifer presents, the latter continues subtly to urge him toward the realization that he can
create his own valuations.
Lucifer presents the possibility, which Cain is completely incapable of
understanding, that Cain might wholly remove himself from God's world. In showing
Cain the expanse ofspace, Lucifer symbolically presents him with a vast ungraduated field
where there is infinite possibility for world-making, unbound by the essentialism implicit in
God's already petrified order of symbols. As Lucifer imparts to Cain concerning the
possibility he has shown the mortal, "Thou knowest that there is / A state, and many states
beyond thine own" (II.ii.173-74). Lucifer offers Cain the possibility to become an
artistically creative subject, a living being, who instead ofmoving within the circles of
God's rigid edifice, might allow the "mass ofimages which originally streamed from the
primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid" (Nietzsche "Truth" 86) to stream
forth, into new "states" once more. In other words, Lucifer urges Cain to create his own,
more fitting metaphors for the particular events and identifications of his life. Cain must
relativize his valuations of good an evil, as illustrated in Lucifer's instructions above.
Furthermore, Lucifer urges Cain to c)udge / Not by words, though of spirits" (II.ii.456-
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57), or in other words, not to wholly invest himseJfin God's monolithic linguistic order.
Rather, Cain should valuate based.on (1he fruits / Ofrbis] existence" (II.ii.457-58). When
Lucifer speaks of death leading to knowledge (Ilii. 164), he deals with a death to the
"state" imposed by God. When that system ofvaluation can die for Cain, when "God is
dead" (Nietzsche GS, 108: 167), then Cain can arrange meaning and identity for himself
apart from, and not simply through a rearrangement of that scheme ofvalues
Near the end of the journey, we find Lucifer deprecating the world Cain clings to.
However, be also implicitly offers possibilities to Cain, as he does throughout the journey.
As Lucifer nears bis departure from Cain, he reiterates his offerings to the disoriented
mortal:
LUCIFER. And now I will convey thee to thy world,
Where thou shalt multiply the race ofAdam,
Eat, drink, toil, tremble, lau~ weep, sleep, and die.
CAIN. And to what end have I beheld these things
Which thou hast shown me?
LUCIFER Didst thou not require
Knowledge? And have I not, in what I show'd,
Taught thee to know thyself?
CAIN. Alas! I seem
Nothing.
LUCIFER And this should be the human sum
Of knowledge, to know mortal nature's nothingness;
S4
Bequeath that science to thy childrel\ and
'Twill spare them many tortures (ll.ii.414-25)
When Lucifer speaks of"convey[ing Cain] to [his own] world" (ll.ii.414), he deals with
God's created order, a specific discursive world, and not existence altogether. The
reduction oflife within such an order to eight items should demonstrate to Cain the
limitations ofa habitation within that world, even where it is rearranged. So long as Cain
resides within that order, he will continue to find himself restricted in such ways. Lucifer's
insistence that he has "taught [Cain] to know [bim]self' (II.ii.420) is authentic in that he
has indeed presented to Cain the limitations on expressions ofindividual identity, which
God's system imposes. Cain's identity within that world is limited by certain precepts
which control the ways in which he can arrange valuations in order to express meaning. It
is natural that Cain should "seem [as n]otmng" (II.ii.420-21), having realized the inherent
problems with being subsumed by a system. There can be no uniqueness in
systematization. Cain fails to realize, however, that in his critique of God's world, Lucifer
also celebrates the creative living being. Lucifer's statement about "[n]othing" being the
"human sum ofknowledge" represents another critique of created system--systems
deprive unique individuals of identity and so long as subjects operate within a system,
cling to an order such as God's, their identity is nil and their knowledge is limited to a
bland, lifeless nihilism. If mortals knew and could accept this beforehand, as Lucifer
suggests, it might save them the trouble ofmaking excessive demands and receiving more
recrimination from such a system. Cain, again, sees the information as deprecation of all
existence. Cain fails in his search for knowledge due to his reliance upon essentialist
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principles and established system; we see this same sort of failure as Cain summarily
misreads Lucifer and the information he presents.
McVeigh comments that Lucifer is most likely a sort ofmanifestation of"one part
... ofCain's soul" which "shapes inchoate doubts and ambitions in Cain's own mind"
(343).1 He goes on to argue that Lucifer influences Cain in three ways: 1) by presenting
him with a nihilistic world-view, 2) by"hasten[ing] Cain's own tendency toward emotional
disorder," and 3) by "widen[ing] the rift between him and his family" (344-45). I see Cain
being affected in these ways on his journey with Lucifer, just as Eve and Adam are
affected by the serpent's presence, and by God's warning against the fruit. However,
while Cain is influenced in ways that correspond to McVeigh's items, we cannot, because
of this influence, deduce Lucifer's own stance. Lucifer eludes any particular situation.
Cain's ultimate nihilism, associated with his eventual return to God's original system,
should be seen in the context of his failed search for knowledge and complete
misinterpretation ofLucifer. It is important to stress that even before the entry ofLucifer,
Cain was already transgressing against God's order, simply in imploring, "wherefore
should I toil" (1.65). In addition, Lucifer is in no way implicated in any temptation or
deception simply because Cain has perceived his presence as uncanny. In fact, Lucifer has
illuminated matters for Cain, who misunderstands the message. By emphasizing a
temptation of Cain by Lucifer, critics such as McVeigh fall prey to the tendency to identify
what accompanies Cain's journey as the cause for his fall.
Lucifer has no interest in bringing about another fall, which he implies in the
1 And Steffan, pg. 365.
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following effort to distance himself from a personal implication in God's world: "/made
ye not; / Ye are his creatures, and not mine" (fiji. 395-96). He func .ons, rather, wholly
outside ofGod's system. Ifhe were concerned with attacking this system, he would
indeed implicate himself as mischief maker, an agent of a God who seeks to bind his
subjects closer to him through punishment. Rather, in his endless play, Lucifer cannot
help but occasionally pass, on tangents, into and out of established worlds. This does not
mean that he occupies or takes a hand in the operation of these worlds, though obviously,
as in this case, his presence is at times unavoidably felt. Only insofar as Lucifer passes,
ghost-like, among worlds, can he be mapped. As Nietzsche comments, such a singular
being is inevitably misinterpreted ( BG&E 40: 51). Without even engaging in systems,
Lucifer's occasional presence around them poses a critique of God as a "supreme" being
who nevertheless requires the creation of subjects and a subjecting structure in order to
conserve a place ofpower. Lucifer clearly distances himselffrom those who "Echo the
sound [of] / / God['s] ... edict" (II.ii.S; 6), and who ''Worship the word which strikes
their ear, deem[ing] / Evil or good what is proclaimed to them" (IT.ii.t 0-11): "I wilJ
have none such" (Ilii.12). He requires no such binding placement within the linguistic
security of systems for solace. Rather, Lucifer's "flight" through space "show[s] ... the
history / Of past, and present, and of future worlds" (II.ii.23-25). While history of past
and present may appear stable enough notions, Lucifer's notion of the history of ' 'future
worlds" radicalizes the entire endeavor, and demonstrates Lucifer's emphasis on
creativity, open possibility, and a fluid perspectivism which seeks to examine and create
from as many vantages as possible. In short, Lucifer dances among worlds.
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Due to his desire to find security and to right himself rather than to take advantage
of the opportunity a lack ofgravity can present, Cain, by contrast, clings to God's order,
through forcing it to punish him, ifnecessary. He reacts to the moral vertigo brought
about by his inability to place Lucifer by demanding that some world, namely God's,
reassert itself so long as it provide him with a point of reference. Cain's final demand calls
for the proximity of God's presence and favor. In his prayer over his offering of fruits,
Cain exclaims "[i]fa shrine without victim, / And altar without gore, may win thy favor, /
Look on it! And for him who dresseth it, / He is--such as thou made him; and seeks
nothing / Which must be won by kneeling: Ifhe's evil, / Strike him! ... / ... Ifhe be
good, / Strike him, or spare him, as thou wilt!" (ill.266-73). In the first two and a half
lines Cain persists in seeing God as not only allowing evil, but encouraging it. The lines
that follow, however, are of more importance. In demanding that God judge him, Cain
calls on God to make an appearance in order to strike or spare him, again transgressing
the divinely imposed limitations. God makes an appearance, not in response to Cain's
demand or in proximity to Cain, but rather as a reception ofAbel's offering and a divine
visitation upon him, estranging Cain once more, splitting him off further from that which
he desires. The stage direction notes that "a whirlwind throws down the altar ofCain"
(ill 279), but this serves as a sign that God will not be visiting Cain, will not address or be
addressed through the given medium. When Cain's demands are not met or answered, he
restates them more aggressively, trying a more direct access to God, to goad him into
action. Either favorable or violently forceful visitation is acceptable to Cain; either, he
believes, lifts the prohibition and brings God into proximity, making Cain whole.
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While Cain claims to destroy Abel's altar in the name ofthe innocent "blood of
lambs and kids / Which fed on milk, to be destroy'd in blood" (Ill.292-93), he in fact
continues to pursue direct access to God. Cain has little concern for animals: he has
already decided that aU mortal life is meaningless, and he is ultimately making one last
effort to demand that God prove him wrong. When Cain purports to destroy the altar, he
really seeks only to provoke God further and to seek access towards God through that
altar, or through its destruction. Critics generally agree with this latter statement. As
Cantor remarks, "[u]nfortunately for Abel, in his brother's eyes he becomes the mask or
wall standing between Cain and his Creator" (59).2 Cain seeks to provoke God, but
when Abel defends his own altar, he stands between Cain and his only route to God and a
possible satisfaction for demand. The fact that Cain warns Abel, along with his four calls
to Abel to "give way" (m.303; 308; 310; 311) and his demand that Abel "give back"
(m.305), points to the conclusion that Cain's aim is to provoke God through the altar.
Despite Abel's mere standing-between, the killing is not merely incidental and
does accomplish certain ends, one being the creation, through linguistic means, of a mask.
It is of particular import that Cain is the first to put together language in such a way,
successfully enacting, with uncontrolled anger and bloodthirstiness as distinguishing
features, the mask of the killer. In his stumbling roughshod among various erratic
perspectives--a nihilistic stance, which nonetheless is quite concerned with are-verification
ofimposed system; an attempt to align himself with his brother's appointed positioning;
and an attempt to assert authority over God and his sacred rites-Cain slays Abel. In so
2 And Elledge, pg. 51.
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doing he takes on as mask the blurred markings of his fitful shifting between perspectives.
For example, Cain understands that he has taken on a new designation after the murder,
realizing he has ''become·/ The native ofanotber and worse world" (Ill.342-43). Further,
in her curse, Cain's mother refers to him as ')'on incarnate spirit / Ofdeatb" (Ill.419-20),
who should feel such designation through "all the curses / Oflife ... [up]on him" (llI.421-
22). Exclaiming ''fratricide!'' Eve also decrees that "henceforth that word is Cain" (III.
438), thus defining her son and his designation specifically in terms of the situation of this
first killing. Cain also brings to bear his misreadings ofLucifer's message, in that he takes
the suggestion that there may be infinite substitution of subjects and signifiers in the field
of language to mean that he can make such substitutions with living beings as well. Cain
has forgotten the creative living being, and sees people merely as subjects ofdiscourse.
This fact demonstrates that Cain has already become so completely integrated within
God's order that he is willing to shape his own system along those same lines as the
original structure. Cain dooms Abel to death, saying "Then take thy life unto thy God, /
Since he loves lives" (Ill.316-17). Here, Cain makes a substitution ofAbel's "life" for the
"lives" of the animals which Abel has sacrificed. In this way, Cain creates language where
the uniqueness ofbeings can be denied (ordered) so thoroughly that they are bereft of life
and are wholly subjects of discourse. Thoroughly implicated in God's system, Cain now
desires its structuring so strongly that he has occupied a position from which he means to
operate the system, to enact its determinism through the subjection of others. Abel
becomes in Cain's substitution no more than a sign passed among the pathways of
discourse, and, bereft of individual existence, can be sacrificed with seemingly as little
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consequence.
Cain's demand goes unanswered, and significantly, when the holy inquiry begins, it
is "the ANGEL ofthe Lord' who comes to deal with Cain, and not God's voice, 'T]n
thunder" (Ill.467; 1.207). Even in punishing Cain, God makes no appearance and only
answers Cain's demand insofar as he re-impresses his system upon him. There are several
further ironic implications of this final situation. As Cantor comments, "in revolt, Cain
plays right into the hands of the tyrannical Creator, accomplishing God's purposes in the
very act ofdefying Him. . .. Seemingly against his will, Cain finds himself turning into a
parody or mirror image of the God he hates: isolated, discontented, and destroying others
to relieve his own frustration" (56). In sacrificing Abel on the altar, Cain dons a mask
which he has valued as a sign or herald ofGod's way. In other words, in his railing
against the order God has imposed, and through his metaphorizing of Abel's actual
existence, Cain at the same time assumes the similarly discursive subjectivity of the killer
within that order, and thus becomes subject to the full force of God's punishment. In this
moment, where Cain rejoins God's world, he seals his fate--it is his defining moment, and
through it he becomes inextricably bound up (as high priest) in a system he decries as
unjust and inconsistent. He does not become whole, but becomes wholly encompassed
and enveloped in that system. The manner in which he marks his place there implicates
him in a way very similar to the way he implicates God--Cain becomes unjust and
inconsistent. Finally, Cain aligns himself with the God he rails against.
While I agree when Cantor asserts that, "in the absence of a divinely imposed
order, the Byronic hero must develop his own code to live by," and that, ''for Cain the
61
understanding that the world order is not moral comes as an epiphany" (61), it is difficult,
in light ofthe evidence at hand, to accept that, '~urderingAbel becomes [Cain's) way of
having himself driven out into the life of solitary wandering he secretly craves" (61). First
ofall, Cain openly craves a sort ofsolitary wandering--at least a wandering that involves
pathways ofmeaning different from those of the established system. After his interstellar
journey, during which he concludes that nothing earthly has any value or meaning, Cain's
"secret craving" is more likely a desire for a reimposition sf some--any-kind of meaning
which will make existence seem less worthless. Though he has tried to "develop his own
code," upon the failure of this venture, he desperately clings to any code which will give
meaning. For all his railery against God and against making sacrifices, Cain nevertheless
makes clear appeals that God favor his offering over that ofAbel. For example, Cain
argues that his
blooming fruits ofearth ...
. . . may seem \
Good to thee, inasmuch as they have not
Suffer'd in life or limb, and rather form
A sample of thy works, than supplication
To look on ours! (JII.259, 262-66)
Here Cain argues for God's disfavor ofAbel's animal offering, which with its necessary
burning, not to mention the rearing of the animals, emphasizes human effort rather than
Godly. Further, he praises God's work which the fiuit evinces, and at the same time
values such Godly work as superior to that of humans. While Cain's more prevalent
62
excess ofdemands seeks to provoke God (and in so doing still implicitly demands that
God accommodate him within his world), Cain is seen in the example above to directly ask
for the favor of the system he has hated. In this way, Cain differs from other Byronic
heroes such as Manfred--Cain, unlike others, is broken and dependent.
Cain delimits himself in such a way that he cannot elude identification along the
lines ofGod's world. For one, he has already given up his failing attempt at
perspectivism, which potentially could have led to new creativity, in favor of an
enveloping essentialist nihilism. More importantly, he has refused the opportunity
presented by Lucifer. In taking an innocent life, at the same moment as he protests the
taking ofinnocent life (and that Edenic life ofinnocence), Cain implicates all that he is and
can be in God's world. His exile may have been completely tolerable had he pursued
knowledge, or the individualism ofLucifer. Cain realizes his new powerlessness,
acquiescing that ''1 did not seek / For life, nor did I make myself' (ID.509-IO), a statement
which suggests that Cain now understands that despite his unasked-for birth he might still
have taken some hand in creating his identity. However, he is now inescapably in a world
that God has imposed, a fact which the Angel verifies in saying "what is done is done"
(III.516). Cain demonstrates an understanding ofhis newly fixed identity, acquiescing that
''That which I am, I am" (III. 509). He takes on the badge ofthe killer, realizing that
designation as inescapable. Really he has two marks; by seeing him, people know he
occupies the place of ''the killer" in God's articulation of meaning. His identity is now
comprised not ofthe potential he once possessed as creative being, but of the signs which
have marked him within God's order. The other mark, the one which says "do not hann
63
him" merely keeps that place well defined and delimited. Now that he is 'lhe killer," he is
completely bound in this system and can take no steps to remove himself.
In pointing out the gaps in God'5 system, Cain reinscribes those gaps within his
own discourse. In defining the inconsistencies in the order, Cain also defines again the
lines along which that order is arranged. In deprecating that order, he also puts it in a
place of importance. Like the mark on his brow, the splits in the order are tattooed upon
his discourse and all his movement through it. Short of stepping outside of God's order,
Cain is destined both to enact another fall through his raillery against a split, a raillery
which defines and arranges the split again, and to move constantly towards further
splitting, more defined and more blatant splitting, and further falls. Indeed, with time, it
must become more and more difficult not to fall; objects of desire become more numerous
and more restricted; demand for them increases; needs become more difficult to satisfY;
the distance between God and man becomes greater and greater. And as more and more
becomes restricted, there is more and more potential for splitting, as humans will be
constantly demanding what is just out of reach, a chance to reach what is stiJI further out
of reach, a chance to go back and try for oneself the things one knows he/she has already
failed at, a chance to fail, like Cain, again.
The linguistic structures ofNietzsche's state and Lacan's Other provide methods
for placement for the arrangement ofGod's rigid world and the subjects therein.
Signifiers such as God, knowledge, and happiness, retain their value in itself, despite
Cain's attempt at perspectivisrn, which merely seeks to rearrange them, not to make them
manifest in any new creative interrelationships. While Nietzsche's perspectivism provides
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a reference for Cain's desire to shift perspective, such a shift falls short of the fluid
creativity which a constantly shifting perspectivism requires. Lucifer, however, is the
perspectivist par excellence, an example of Nietzsche's artistically creating subject, who
offers possibilities which the severely restricted Cain misinterprets outright. Upon his
return to earth, the omnipresence ofLacanian desire in Cain drives him more and more
violently toward some complete envelopment within a system where love and hate are
unconditional. Cain's repeated demands produce a desire so great that he loses himself in
discourse, and sacrifices the life ofhis brother, Cain's final failure, to that same body.
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Conclusion
Cain's failures ultimately re-articulate Romantic integration, though the drama
critiques, to an extent, such an idea. Despite Cain's exile, God's system envelops him,
fixing him in a position much more thoroughly and permanently than when he is a fitful
rebel. Though Cain rebels openly for almost the entire drama, he consistently seeks the
wholeness, which, despite the unfitting nature of God's world, he believes resides in
integration with that world. Though finally the integration·takes the fonn ofa new
imposition onto Cain and his descendants, his subjectivity nevertheless comes into an
arrangement according with the transcendent, essentialist world which he prizes. Besides
both the lack of free will on Cain's part, and the fact that what might have been a unique
individualism in him is obliterated by the imposition, Cain still comes into an alignment
which accords with the confines of God's realm. Lucifer, however, is not caught in such a
way, and is a revolutionary figure in Romantic poetry, a figure which stands triumphantly
outside the limits of rigid systematization and any need for integration. Lucifer remains
beyond both the system and the requirement ofintegration for creativity, artistically
forming the expression he requires fitting the moment and for the unique things and events
which he encounters. An appeal to the Romantic literary theory ofCain's time lays
groundwork for a look at the drama's grounding in. such theory, and comparisons as to its
critiquing certain of these key ideas. Such a critique is implicit in most ofCain, but is
presented chiefly by Lucifer's distance from such integration, and his presentation ofthe
possibility for limitless revaluation, a revolutionary stance which Jooks ahead to the
thought ofNietzsche and Lacan.
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The Romantic literary theory ofthe era ofCain requires of the poet an integral
alignment among elements or faculties. Samuel Coleridge argues in chapter 14 ofhis
Biographia Literaria, that the "poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul
ofman into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their
relative worth and dignity.... He diffuses a tone, a spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it
were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we have
exclusively appropriated the name ofimagination" (319). One important implication is
that all the various faculties ofthe human soul can be brought into a harmonious unity.
When the faculties have been ordered along the lines oftheir proper articulation, then the
poet or the "whole soul" has also found its place in relation to a particular articulation of
meaning or being. The soul finds or is given its place in a world; through its relationship
with a particular "higher being," the soul occupies a particular place and meaning within
the order where "nature" or "God" is set up in a place of primacy. Coleridge's formulation
describes the poet's soul, and by extension the idea that the poet's soul communicates
itselfthrough his work. Such an alignment offaculties or elements ideally applies to the
work as well.
The Coleridgean schema which sees the subject '''ring[ing] the whole soul ... into
activity," depends upon a free will in the subject to arrange itself in accordance with a
transcendent model. Such a bringing and willing are precluded in the detenninistic system
working in Cain. The humans, like the subjects of Nietzsche's state, have no choice about
the arrangement of their world, and nor, if they are to integrate with that world, can they
arrange the alignment of their faculties or their system of expression. This situation does
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not, however, negate the implications of the Romantic integration. In fact, the nature of
the deterministic, imposed world presented in Cain prescribes that those who integrate
there, and whose souls are arranged accordingly, must be integrated and arranged not by
their own will, which might challenge God's, but through the persistent reimposition of
that rigid structure onto them. Indeed, as God's systeI!\ like Lacan's Other, includes
lacks and is split, it follows that subjects enveloped therein will be split in their accord with
that system. While integration does not necessarily lead to wholeness in a strict
Coleridgean sense, the subjects in Cain come into accord with the higher ideal, bearing
out the main thrust ofColeridge's formulation, and at the same time critiquing it by way of
the noted absence or impotence ofwill.
While the integrative themes ofCain align with Romantic theory ofthe time, the
drama presents, in its compliance, a pessimistic view of such integration. Part of the
significance ofCain lies in the fact that the work stands out as an early evaluation ofthe
problems with systems like, but by no means limited to, that ofRomantic theory. The
scrutiny is primarily religious in the context of the drama, but it also applies to all such
impositions of order. The drama makes clear the fact that systems cannot approximate the
particular needs of the unique individual, as the theory of Nietzsche and Lacan shows.
Systems inevitably fall short of such accommodations, and in the interim emerges desire,
the transgressive dynamo which always drives towards more fitting individual expression,
and thus towards further transgressions ofprescribed limits. Byron's formulation, "the
menace ofHell makes as many devils as the severe penal codes ofinhuman humanity make
villains" (1016), proves particularly apt for Cain. The imposition ofcreated systems
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produces aberration, like Lacanian desire and the Nietzschean bad conscience, because
inevitably such imposition fails to account for unique elements in the individual subjected
to its envelopment. Evil, in Cain, lies at the heart of God's order, which reduces
uniqueness to conformity. Evil lies outside oforder, villainy outside of codes, only insofar
as one is within, a part of, and blinded by that order.
The treatment of masks in Cain presents another critique ofRomantic sensibility.
Through Coleridge's idea of the alignment offaculties, the essential being, the authentic
character of the poet should be clearly recognizable. The Nietzschean idea ofthe mask,
however, is bound up in semblance. Cain's mask is constructed of elements already
present in God's system. The mask does not make his uniqueness more apparent, though
he occupies a more distinct placement, but rather obliterates it completely. Through his
striking out against God through Abel, Cain implicates himself fully in the world of the
unreasonable and tyrannous God. The mask he wears as killer, a more distinct marker and
signifier than had been associated with him as rebel, ties together God's entrenched order
more fully, marking the progress offalling within that system more thoroughly. And when
Cain is stamped with the mark of order, he finds a complete lack of discursive particularity
in his integration. Cain becomes a cipher, completely alienated from any other situation in
any world, besides that which he inhabits. Desiring a shift in value, Cain attains fixity.
Integration in Cain, then, signifies conformity and loss ofdistinction, rather than the
Romantic ideal of essential communication of character. The totalizing mask ofCain's
integration succeeds in communicating only those elements ofhis subjectivity which are
essential to the system.
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Lucifer represents the real triumph ofCain. While PauJ Cantor seems correct in
his claim that "Cain . . . lay[s] bare the roots ofwhat we often think ofas twentieth-
century concerns: metaphysical despair and nihilism" (51), at least in terms of the
character of Cain, Lucifer nevertheless offers a more optimistic and adventurous view, as
well The character of Cain indispensably sets forth the idea of split subjectivity, and
demonstrates the impossibility ofsystems approximating individuals. Lucifer, however, as
the Nietzschean artistically creating being, offers an alternative manner of arranging
meaning. This creative perspectivism only takes place outside of established worlds where
one arranges, rearranges, and does away with meaning and valuation in a constantly
shifting process which requires no pennanent creation or imposition. While Cain fails
repeatedly, Lucifer presents a method which looks ahead to the thought ofNietzsche and
Lacan, where valuation is tenuous and shifting, meaning produced by difference and
interrelationship rather than inhering as an essence in any single edifice of language. In
this way, Cain marks the division between Romantic integration, seen pessimistically, and
alternatives to such integration, where valuation, not fixed or transcendent, is rather
arranged moment by moment, to fit particular needs and relational situations more
appropriately. Lucifer creates in the Nietzschean sense beyond good and evil, beyond the
limits of any rigid system, rather than integrated in the Coleridgean sense wholly within the
world order which communicates its essence to the soul of the poet. Lucifer, no ordinary
mischief-maker or representation of evil, is a revolutionary character in Romantic poetry,
independent of needs for integration and free of the restraints of a restrictive alignment.
The factors explored here distinguish Cain as an important transitional work, still
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rooted in the Romanticism of its time, yet also looking beyond such a situation in its
pessimistic view of alignment and in the character ofLucifer. Though its expounding of
these ideas lacks the thoroughness and rigor of late nineteenth and twentieth-century
thought, this drama nevertheless begins to introduce very important ideas not only as
alternatives to Romantic integration and transcendence, but also as precursors to later
thought. Cain is one of the first literary works to express such ideas as those explored
here--such as the lack of wholeness in systems and subjects, the mask and conformity in
identity, and the requirement ofa perspectivism and creativity like that developed by
Nietzsche in order to more aptly approximate particularity. This fact represents an
important transition, within the integration of transcendental union, yet looking towards
more existential thinking of people like Nietzsche and Lacan. While a work such as Cain
could never have thought the thoughts ofNietzsche or Lacan, the drama serves to give
rise to and open a place for such notions as thinkers like these would later explore so
prominently.
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